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I. INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause' is a puzzle that remains unsolved to
this day. The fog enveloping the Establishment Clause springs at
Copyright 2006, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* J.D., B.A. Yale University. Email: richard.albert@aya.yale.edu. I am
grateful to several friends for our discussions on the role of religion in the
American Republic and for their comments on previous drafts of this article. I
am particularly indebted to Bruce Ackerman, Rex Ahdar, Akhil Amar, Anita
Bernstein, Stephen Carter, George Dent, Howard Friedman, Marci Hamilton,
Tarik Haskins, Brooks Holifield, Mark Jordan, Paul Kaufman, Kris Kobach, Jon
Nichols, Larry Obhof, Michael Perry, Anthony Picarello, Frank Ravitch, Charles
Rice, Ron Rrychlak, John Wagner, and Daniel Walfish. I am also appreciative
of the exceptional editors of the Louisiana Law Review-specifically Amanda
Coney, Jacob Kantrow, Alexander Mijalis, and Alison Nunez-for their careful
criticisms and attention to detail in bringing this article to print.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... ).
2. Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First Amendment, 38 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 487 (2004) ("Scholars have attempted to solve this
puzzle in different ways."); see also Jonathan Frels, Note, Simplifying
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Student-Selected Prayer Cases Through
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once from its indeterminate text, disputed history,4 and incoherent
application by federal and state courts.5 Yet what constitutes an
establishment of religion is not in and of itself a theoretically
obscure concept. Applying theory to practice, however, has
proven elusive. Indeed, if anything is discernible from the
evolving case law on the Establishment Clause, it is that the
common law doctrine of establishment is anything but consistently
applicable to real world disputes.
But the Establishment Clause was not inherently fated to this
dismal destiny when it was conceived two centuries ago by
America's founding luminaries. On the contrary, as the first civil
freedom enshrined in the United States Bill of Rights, the
Establishment Clause once held-and indeed continues to hold-
great promise for the American project of democracy. Much of
that promise was stunted in the early days of nationhood as a result
the Use of Public Forum Principles, 20 REV. LrrIG. 233, 236 (2000)
(characterizing Establishment Clause as a "puzzle").
3. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Even More Honest Than Ever Before:
Abandoning Pretense and Recreating Legitimacy in Constitutional
Interpretation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 380 (1995) (tracing difficulty of
interpreting Establishment Clause to its indeterminate text).
4. Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based
Judicial Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L.
REV. 343, 372 (1993) (arguing that history of Establishment Clause is unsettled
and conflicting); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 237-38 (1963) (acknowledging that history of Establishment Clause is
ambiguous).
5. Compare Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 1024 (1998) (holding that prayer and moment of silence at
school events did not violate Establishment Clause), with Chandler v. James,
985 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (invalidating statute providing for
voluntary prayer at school events as violative of Establishment Clause);
compare Ala. ex rel. James v. ACLU of Ala., 711 So. 2d 952 (Ala. 1998)
(holding injusticiable claim that judge impermissibly displayed Ten
Commandments plaque in courtroom), with Suhre v. Haywood County, 131
F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that citizen has standing to challenge
constitutionality of Ten Commandments' display in courtroom); Benjamin S.
Genshaft, Note, With History, All Things Are Secular: The Establishment Clause
and the Use of History, 52 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 573, 574, 592-93 (2001)
("This ambiguity regarding the cultural value of a religious practice makes it
difficult for lower courts to apply the fabric of society logic on a consistent
basis."); See, e.g., Harlan A. Loeb, Suffering in Silence: Camouflaging the
Redefinition of the Establishment Clause, 77 OR. L. REV. 1305, 1335 (1998)
("The Supreme Court's inconsistency in analyzing Establishment Clause cases
has given lower federal and state courts excessive leeway to interpret these
cases. With no firm doctrine to guide them, and more acute extra-jurisprudential
pressures, judges have a number of tests from which to choose and no guidance
or safe haven upon which they can comfortably rely.").
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of an unsteady and intellectually uneven application of the Clause.
Still today, America's first freedom has yet to recover from its
confusing construction during the first years of the American
republic.
Many point directly to the Supreme Court of the United States
for this lamentable state of affairs.6 I disagree with this diagnosis.
6. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 221 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that the Court has
"reaped the scorn of a confused and aroused public because it has been erratic
and unprincipled in its decisions"); id. at 220-22 ("The Supreme Court has been
inexcusably inconsistent in its interpretation of the establishment clause.");
Stephen L. Carter, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 109 (1993) (observing that "the
embarrassing truth is that the Establishment Clause has no theory"); Kevin T.
Baine, Education Litigation: Prospects for Change, 35 CATH. LAW. 283, 287
(1994) (declaring that "the Supreme Court has decided a series of education
cases that, read together, simply defy comprehension"); Thomas C. Berg,
Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 693 (1997) ("That
the Supreme Court has made a mess of this area is agreed to by most everyone,
including many of the justices themselves."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the
Rehnquist Court is Wrong About the Establishment Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
221, 236 (2001) ("The Rehnquist Court is just wrong when it comes to the
Establishment Clause."); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 578 (1996) ("[A]n
examination of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of religious liberty is not at
all reassuring. True, it is relatively theory-free, but, as most commentators and
many of the Justices would agree, it is also a complete hash."); David Felsen,
Developments in Approaches to Establishment Clause Analysis: Consistency for
the Future, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 395, 396 (1989) (stating that courts have
developed "an ad hoc approach to establishment clause analysis"); Frederick
Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Religion Clause Theory, 27 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1233, 1233 (1997) ("Recent scholarship on the religion clauses has
displayed a persistent preoccupation with the obvious lack of coherence in the
Supreme Court's decisions in this area."); Mary Ann Glendon, Law,
Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 672, 674 (1992) (stating that "the Supreme Court's Religion
Clause case law has reached the point where it is described on all sides as
confused, inconsistent, and incoherent"); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes,
Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 536 (1991) ("A majority of the
members of the current Court now appear to have concluded that the Religion
Clause jurisprudence of the past fifty years is seriously flawed."); Mark R.
Killenbeck, The Qualities of Completeness: More? or Less?, 97 MICH. L. REv.
1629, 1657 (1999) (arguing that "the Court's various solutions to the
[establishment] problems are often confused and confusing at best"); William P.
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court Establishment, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 495,495 (1986) ("In the forty years since Everson, the Court has
reached results in establishment cases that are legendary in their
inconsistencies."); Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the
Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2000) (arguing that
"Establishment Clause jurisprudence remains plagued by inconsistencies");
Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and
Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1995) ("The Court has
2006]
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It is an inaccurate and incomplete criticism to blame the Supreme
Court for the current landscape of establishment jurisprudence.
Modem establishment doctrine-incoherent though it may be7-is
more properly viewed as an evolving product of the continuing
public constitutional discourse among Americans and between
public and private forces about the proper role of religion in the
American polity. Just as early Americans debated among
themselves, armed with their differing hopes and visions about
how to mediate the intersection of religion and the state, so too
Supreme Court decisions have, on a parallel track, reflected the
changing contours of this important debate-a conversation that
has yet to cede center stage in the American public square.
Nevertheless, it is true that in the period leading up to and
immediately following disestablishment in the several states, the
Supreme Court struggled to delineate what an impermissible
establishment of religion entailed as a matter of law. Drawing
upon colonial practices that had fostered intimate, if not
inextricable, ties between religion and the state-a union that was,
nonetheless, wholly in keeping with the laws of the time-the
Court defined an impermissible establishment of religion simply
held that some governmental actions violate the Establishment Clause, while
others do not, without articulating a principled or even discernible distinction
between the constitutional actions and those held unconstitutional."); Ronald Y.
Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Doctrine in Transition, 44 MERCER L. REv. 881, 883 (1993) (stating that the
Court has "evinced a schizoid approach to Establishment Clause cases, moving
erratically between the strict separationist standard promulgated in Everson and
the accommodationist theory advocated by Justice Reed"); Steven D. Smith,
Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision,
67 TEX. L. REv. 955, 956 (1989) (stating that the Court's "[p]revailing doctrine
is widely disparaged by commentators and Supreme Court Justices alike");
Christal L. Hoo, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Publicly Display the Ten
Commandments: A Call for a Reevaluation of Current Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 683, 697 (2004) (arguing that the Court's
"historical method of relying simply on imperfect analogies with past practices
has produced inconsistent results"). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has
become bedeviled (so to speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are
not derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional
traditions.") (citations omitted); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636, 640
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has "made such a maze of
the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental
officials can only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional").
7. Mark V. Tushnet, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 247 (1988) (describing religion jurisprudence as being
"in significant disarray").
8. See infra Part IV.A.
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with reference to what had once been allowable under the laws of
the several establishmentarian states prior to disestablishment.
The Court's first definitions of an establishment of religion set
the constitutional terms of reference as a negation-that is,
according to what had once been lawful. 9 The consequence was to
frame the purpose of the Establishment Clause as a protection from
something destructive, rather than as an aspiration to something
virtuous. Thus, the Court initially defined the Establishment
Clause as a necessary shield against forces that could unravel the
fabric of the new nation. But this defensive posture toward
religion did not endure. 10
The Court's first forays into the scope of the Establishment
Clause were cacophonous and conceptually elusive. Specifically,
in the same breath that it spoke of the Establishment Clause as a
necessary safeguard against the infusion of religion into public life,
the Court also described religion as a vital feature of the American
polity, one that most accurately defined the emergent national
identity of the dissimilar peoples that then populated the new
American republic." On the one hand, religion was to be viewed
with circumspection. Yet, on the other, religion was extolled as
the cornerstone of the American way of life. The Court, therefore,
conveyed a conflicting message about the role and importance of
religion, simultaneously cautioning against its disruptive potential
and exalting its unique function in the American project of
democracy. These early pronouncements cultivated an unshakable
ambiguity in the purpose and meaning of the Establishment Clause
that persists to this day. However, it is incorrect to name the
Supreme Court as the definitive source of the disharmony that has
become synonymous with the Establishment Clause.
In this article, I endeavor to move beyond simply condemning
the judiciary for creating and subsequently sustaining, with its
erratic pen, the incoherence that characterizes modem
establishment doctrine. I seek instead to discover the knotty roots
of the Court's evolving establishment case law. In Part II, I
demonstrate that the three elemental principles that must inform
any construction of the Establishment Clause are not intrinsically
hopeless to define: (1) an established church; (2) an establishment
of religion; and (3) religion. Indeed these terms-even the
otherwise complex term religion, for which the Court has devised
a sensible definitional strategy-are theoretically straightforward
to understand. However, as a matter of practice, these terms are
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inordinately intricate and, therefore, unusually challenging for the
judiciary to situate in the context of a private or public dispute. I
lay this to bare in Part III, which canvasses the labyrinth of often
inexplicable and discordant cases that have been decided pursuant
to the Establishment Clause.
In Part IV, I seek to explain why establishment jurisprudence is
so incoherent. I trace the origin of establishment dissonance to the
early years of the new republic, an era during which the colonies-
turned-states were themselves unsure about the role of religion in
the emerging nation. Some states at once mandated Christian
beliefs while purporting to afford their citizens religious freedom.
Others even disclaimed established churches in their constitutional
documents, just as they extended certain advantages and privileges
to particular religious faiths. On this view, the incoherence of the
modem establishment case law did not emerge from the judiciary.
It sprang instead from the new republic itself, a loose collection of
states that were both individually and collectively struggling to
find a way to accommodate the diversity of religious beliefs of the
day, while also ensuring that public institutions would be neither
animated nor driven by religious preferences. In Part V, I close
with a few remarks about the role of religion in participatory
democracy and the future course of establishment case law.
II. DEFINING ESTABLISHMENT
The Bill of Rights forbids the establishment of an official state
religion. By its own terms, the Establishment Clause prohibits
Congress from passing a law designating a national religion.' 2 The
reach of this interdiction has extended beyond the federal
government since 1947, the year marking the Supreme Court
judgment incorporating the Establishment Clause against the
several states. 13 The Bill of Rights also contains the Free Exercise
Clause pursuant to which neither Congress nor the states, since
1940,'4 may encroach upon the right to freely practice any
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion .... ").
13. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the
Establishment Clause).
14. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the Free
Exercise Clause).
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religion. 15 Together, these twin constitutional protections embody
the promise of religious liberty in American constitutional law.'
6
But the meaning of the Establishment Clause has continued to
confound both judges' 7 and scholars. '8 Though most agree that the
Establishment Clause should be governed by a rule of neutrality,
judges and scholars disagree on the proper scope of this mandated
neutrality. 19 They also disagree on whether the Establishment
Clause should constrain the several states.20 Three phrases--each
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] .... ).
16. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000) ("Indeed,
the common purpose of the Religion Clauses is to secure religious liberty.")
(citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing Establishment Clause case law as in "hopeless
disarray"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[s]ubstantial revision of
our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order"); Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(identifying the need for "a single, more encompassing construction of the
Establishment Clause").
18. See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984) (stating that
Establishment Clause doctrine is "muddled and internally inconsistent"); Philip
B. Kurland, The Religious Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV.
1, 10 (1984) (declaring that Establishment Clause decisions are "derived from
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland").
19. Compare Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963) (holding that the proper policy pursuant to the Establishment Clause is
"strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion"), and Geoffrey R. Stone
et al., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 517 (1999) (explaining that advocates of strict
neutrality believe that religious institutions must fulfill secular criteria in order
to lawfully benefit from government action or inaction), with Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 92-108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause does not "prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion"), and Stone, supra note 19, at 518
(stating that advocates of benevolent neutrality believe that government may
assist religion provided it does so equitably among all religions).
20. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring that Establishment Clause was not
incorporated against states by Fourteenth Amendment), and Akhil Reed Amar,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 227 (1998) (making
case against incorporation on strength of historical reading of Establishment
Clause), with Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that
Establishment Clause applies against states), and William K. Leitzau,
Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of
Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1210 (1990) ("While many specific
Bill of Rights incorporations have been criticized, none are so thoroughly
contradicted by the historically discernible intentions of our forefathers than that
of the establishment clause.").
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of which is indispensable to a working understanding of the
Establishment Clause-have conspired to exacerbate these
prevailing ambiguities: (1) religion; (2) an established church; and
(3) an establishment of religion. Of these three, the easiest to
define may be an established church. The most difficult may be
the term religion.
A. Religion
Defining the term religion is no easy task.2' Yet it is a
necessary condition to fashioning principled establishment
jurisprudence. One scholar offers three reasons why it is necessary
for courts to come to grips with this complex subject. First, the
court must define religion "because it determines what is protected
and what is not."' 22 Moreover, such a definition "permit[s] an
answer as to whether such diverse beliefs as Confucianism,
political philosophy, Marxism, Communism, belief in GNP, being
a millionaire, and even atheism, are, in fact, religions." 23 Finally,
the most compelling reason is that the Constitution demands
nothing less:
[T]he Constitution itself requires that we provide a
definition. It protects the free exercise and prohibits
establishment of something called "religion." In
adjudicating Commerce Clause cases, courts define
"commerce." Similarly, in adjudicating Due Process cases,
courts define "life," "liberty," and "property." There is no
reason to think that the procedure should be different for
the First Amendment.
24
Dictionaries and encyclopedias have readily reduced this
notion to its least common denominator, something surely
remarkable given that religion-which remains largely
unknowable and impenetrable-is so central to most human lives.
There appear to be two common elements to these definitions of
religion: (1) belief in the existence of a larger force; and (2)
adherence to a code of human conduct.
One dictionary defines religion as "[a] system of faith and
worship usually involving belief in a supreme being and usually
21. See Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE LIBERAL
STATE 110-25 (2005).
22. Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23
HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 314 (1994).
23. Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 315-16 (citations omitted).
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containing a moral or ethical code.",25 Another defines it as "belief
in a reverence for a supernatural power or powers regarded as
creator and governor of the universe; a personal or institutionalized
system grounded in such belief and worship."26 Religion has also
been defined in the following three ways: (1) as "recognition on
the part of man of some higher unseen power as control of his
destiny, and as being entitled to obedience, reverence, and
worship; the general mental and moral attitude resulting from this
belief, with reference to its effect upon the individual or the
community"; 27 (2) as "a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature,
and purpose of the universe, [especially] when considered as the
creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving
devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral
code governing the conduct of human affairs"; 28 and (3) as "a
system of beliefs about reality, existence, the universe, the
supernatural or the divine and practices arising out of these
beliefs."29 Similar definitions have been echoed elsewhere.3 °
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1293-94 (7th ed. 1999).
26. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1474
(4th ed. 2000).
27. XIII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 568-69 (2d ed. 1989).
28. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1628 (Stuart
Berg Flexner ed., 2001).
29. INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 155 (Richard Kennedy ed.,
1984).
30. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONS
915-16 (1999) (defining religion as "a system of communal belief and practices
relative to superhuman beings"); HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION
893 (Jonathan Z. Smith ed., 1995) (defining religion as "a system of beliefs and
practices that are relative to superhuman beings"); IX NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 1016 (15th ed. 1995) (defining religion as "human beings' relation
to that which they regard as holy, sacred, spiritual, or divine"); COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA 2300 (Barbara A. Chernow & George A. Vallasi eds., 5th ed.
1993) (defining religion as "a system of thought, feeling, and action that is
shared by a group and that gives the members an object of devotion; a code of
behavior by which individuals may judge the personal and social consequences
of their actions; and a frame of reference by which individuals may relate to
their group and their universe"); WEBSTER'S NEWWORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA 939
(9th rev. ed. 1992) (defining religion as a "code of belief or philosophy, which
often involves the worship of a God or gods"); COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1309 (3d ed. 1991) (defining religion as a "belief in, worship of, or obedience to
a supernatural power or powers considered to be divine or to have control of
human destiny; any formal or institutionalized expression of such belief; the
attitude and feeling of one who believes in a transcendent controlling power or
powers"); RANDOM HOUSE ENCYCLOPEDIA 2525 (James Mitchell ed., 1977)
(defining religion as a "particular system of beliefs and resulting practices
stimulated by some awareness of a supreme being or power"); AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 54-55 (2d prtg. 1970) (defining
religion as "includ[ing] a belief in the being and perfections of God, in the
2006]
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Framing a theoretical definition of religion is one thing, but
piecing together an applicable one is quite another. The great
difficulty in devising a workable meaning-one that may be
applied as a baseline against the realities of both mundane and
peculiar human interactions that give rise to legal disputes-helps
explain why courts have yet to articulate a viable definition of
religion. The United States Supreme Court has generally described
the notion of religion in expansive and innocuous phrases: "the
term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will."31 The Court has
also stated that "[t]he essence of religion is belief in a relation to
God involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation. 32 Lower courts have offered more specificity in defining
religion although their efforts are, likewise, mostly sweeping
generalizations that remain of little use to resolving legal
disputes.
33
Perhaps recognizing the peril and intricacy involved in
delimiting the four comers of religion, the Supreme Court has
instead chosen to cultivate a policy of deference to assertions of
religious belief. The controlling signpost in this respect affirms
that the Court must refrain from passing judgment upon the
validity of a religious belief, so long as the belief is articulated
with sincerity.34 This rule applies with the same force to constrain
revelation of his will to man, in man's obligation to obey his commands, in a
state of reward and punishment, and in man's accountableness to God; and also
true godliness or piety of life, with the practice of all moral duties"); XII
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 739 (1909) (defining religion as "the voluntary
subjection of oneself to God").
31. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890), abrogated by Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
32. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting), overruled in part by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
33. See, e.g., Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 45 F. Supp. 2d 368, 378
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("First, a religion addresses fundamental and ultimate questions
having to do with deep and imponderable matters. Second, a religion is
comprehensive in nature; it consists of a belief-system as opposed to an isolated
teaching. Third, a religion often can be recognized by the presence of certain
formal and external signs."); Africa v. Hom, 998 F. Supp. 557, 559 (E.D. Pa.
1998) ("The general indicia of a religion include a comprehensive belief system
which addresses fundamental questions regarding life and morality and which
has formal signs or structural characteristics such as ceremonies, observances
and organization. It consists of more than isolated teachings or ideas, however
sincerely committed one may be to them.").
34. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (holding that the judiciary
may not inquire into the veracity or reasonableness of a religious belief).
[Vol. 67
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the actions of government. Thus, although some "might be
tempted to question the existence of... [a] 'Supreme Being' or the
truth of his concepts," explains the Court, such questions "are
inquiries foreclosed to Government." 35 Indeed, all inquiries into
the truth, validity, or reasonableness of religious beliefs are beyond
the permissible reach of the state, 36 just as "religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others
in order to merit First Amendment protection.A
37
It may be that any functional definition of religion is doomed
to either over- or under-inclusiveness, 38 but this has not
discouraged scholars from venturing into the fray.39 For James
Donovan, for instance, the best definition of religion is a
"generative functional one," which leads him to suggest that
religion is "any belief system which serves the psychological
function of alleviating death anxiety." 40 The Supreme Court has
evolved its understanding of religion in at least four steps, writes
Donovan, beginning with the belief-action dichotomy unveiled in
Reynolds v. United States,41 an 1878 case upholding a polygamy
conviction, followed by the sincerity test in United States v.
35. Id. at 184. See also United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494, 1499
(D. Wyo. 1995), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1006 (1997) ("The first [proposition] is
that one man's religion will always be another man's heresy. The Court will
not, therefore, find that a particular set of beliefs is not religious because it
disagrees with the beliefs. Nor will the Court find that a particular set of beliefs
is not religious because the beliefs are, from either the Court's or society's
perspective, idiosyncratic, strange, solipsistic, fantastic, or peculiar. The second
proposition is that if there is any doubt about whether a particular set of beliefs
constitutes a religion, the Court will err on the side of freedom and find that the
beliefs are a religion. In a country whose founders were animated in large part
by a desire for religious liberty, to do otherwise would ignore a venerable (albeit
checkered) history of freedom and tolerance.") (citations omitted).
36. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187
(1946).
37. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981).
38. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development Part I.- The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1423-31 (1967).
39. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 (1989); Andrew W. Austin, Faith
and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1991); Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753
(1984); Val D. Ricks, To God God's, To Caesar Caesar's, and to Both the
Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053 (1993).
40. James M. Donovan, God is as God Does: Law, Anthropology, and the
Definition of "Religion ", 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 95 (1995).
41. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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Ballard 42 the individual mental structure test in United States v.
Seeger,43 and finally the psychological positioning test in Welsh v.
United States.44 Another scholar stops short of defining religion,
cautioning that perhaps "only the individual can define religion in
a manner wholly satisfactory to that individual. ' '4 In this respect,
the challenge for the judiciary is to recognize that practically
anything may be given religious import, particularly in light of the
relocation of religious believers' convictions from once
exclusively moored in faith to now at least partly tethered in
culture:
[N]othing is intrinsically secular. Anything whatsoever can
be given religious meaning and purpose: cooking, planting,
war, medicine, commerce, play, and politics. In an integral
culture, these activities are not just governed by religion;
they are the religion itself. They are the very ways in
which people make.contact with powers which are beyond
the ordinary. This is a challenge for our courts, which
should see that we are all allowed to follow our traditions
so far as this can be reconciled with our living together.
46
B. Established Church
Dictionaries and encyclopedias generally agree on the meaning
of an established church. One defines it as "the church as by law
established in any country, as the public or state-recognized form
of religion.' 47 Another reads the term to mean a "church that a
government officially recognizes as a national institution and to
which it accords support.' Yet another defines it as a "church
that is recognized by law, and sometimes financially supported, as
the official church of a nation."49  Still another defines an
established church as a "church that is officially recognized as a
national institution."50  Others offer similar explications. 5 1 Yet
42. 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944), rev'd, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
43. 380 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1965).
44. 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970).
45. C. John Sommerville, Defining Religion and the Present Supreme
Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167, 169 (1994).
46. Id. at 171.
47. III OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 201 (2d ed. 1989).
48. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 609
(4th ed. 2000).
49. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 663 (Stuart
Bert Flexer ed., 2001).
50. COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 531 (3d ed. 1991).
[Vol. 67
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE
perhaps the simplest definition of an established church is also the
clearest: a "church[] enjoying privileged status." 52 It is not until
the focus turns from the narrow phrase "established church" to the
broader notion of "establishment" (as in an establishment of
religion), that it becomes difficult to reach agreement.
53
C. Establishment of Religion
The concept of establishment is commonly accepted as an
"ecclesiastical system established by law" 54 in which "[tihe union
of Church and State set[s] up a definite and distinct relation
between the two." 55  The United States Supreme Court has
weighed in on the term on several occasions, most notably sixty
years ago. 56  In its first pronouncement on the meaning of the
incorporated Establishment Clause-a declaration that remains,
even now, its most influential on the scope of the Establishment
51. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD RELIGIONS
334 (1999) (defining the term as "a church recognized by law as the official
church of a state or nation and supported by civil authority. The church is not
free to make changes in such things as doctrine, order, or worship without the
consent of the state. In accepting such obligations, the church usually, though
not always, receives financial support and other special privileges."); OXFORD
DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 319 (John Westerdale Bowker ed., 1997)
(defining the term as "[a]ny church recognized by state law as the official
religion of a country"); IV NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 567 (15th ed.
1995) (defining the term as "a church recognized by law as the official church of
a state or nation and supported by civil authority"); INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 68 (Richard Kennedy ed., 1984) (defining the term as
a "denomination that enjoys a particularly privileged position within a country
such as the Anglican Church within England or the Lutheran Church in
Denmark"); CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 344 (David William
Voorhees ed., 1983) (defining the term as a "[c]hurch[] supported by tax funds
or by direct grants of aid"); ABINGTON DICTIONARY OF LIVING RELIGIONS 240
(Keith Crim ed., 1981) (defining the term as "any church recognized by civil
law as the official religion of a country or region"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 778 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., 1971) (defining the term as "a church that is recognized by law as the
official church of a nation, that is supported by civil authority, and that receives
in most instances financial support from the government through some system
of taxation); V CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 548 (1909) (defining the term as "a
distinctive name for the ecclesiastical system established by law").
52. DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA 401 (Daniel G. Reed ed.,
1990).
53. See Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious
Freedom?, 49 McGill L.J. 635, 638-48 (2004).
54. V OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 405 (2d ed. 1989).
55. V CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 548 (1909).
56. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Clause57-the Court defined an establishment of religion to a
degree of specificity that would impress the most dutiful
legislators:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between Church and State." 58
This passage reads like a statute, outlining a rough sketch of
the types of activities public bodies and officials must refrain from
undertaking in order to remain squarely within the lawful bounds
of the Establishment Clause. According to the Everson Court, the
Establishment Clause forbids governments from designating an
official church or religion, compelling church attendance, dictating
religious belief, endorsing religion or the religious, imposing taxes
in support of religion or the religious, and sharing a role in the
governance of religious institutions. Armed with such a detailed
crib sheet-and setting aside whether the Court should have even
ventured beyond its proper minimalist role to issue such exhaustive
57. Several lower federal and state courts have relied on the Court's
Everson ruling to decide the establishment issues before them. See, e.g.,
Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 534
U.S. 946 (2001); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 1996); Kreisner v.
City of San Diego, 988 F.2d 883, 888 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
1044 (1994); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 45 F. Supp. 2d 368, 375
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 827 (2001); Amancio v. Town of Somerset, 28 F. Supp. 2d
677, 678 (D. Mass. 1998); Stark v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 640, 938 F. Supp. 544,
549 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd, 123 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1094 (1998); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 186 (Tex. 2001); Arnold v.
Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478,483 (Tenn. 1997).
58. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.
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instructions to public officers59 -it is perhaps inexplicable that the
Court's modem understanding of what constitutes an establishment
of religion has been so patently uneven since Everson.
III. MODERN ESTABLISHMENT DOCTRINE
Perhaps as a result of the difficulty in defining the terms
religion, established church, and establishment, contemporary
establishment jurisprudence has been nothing if not incoherent. A
certain measure of inconsistency is expected from all public
institutions, even the august deliberative body that is America's
highest Court. It is an inevitable consequence of changing social
contexts and rotating personnel, both of which conspire with the
Court's limited docket and judicial resources to create the perfect
storm. Perhaps with more time and resources, the Court could
conceivably tie up all of the loose ends in its expansive corpus of
cases.60 But even acknowledging that the Court's decisions will
59. Chicago law and political science scholar Cass Sunstein has developed a
persuasive theory of judicial minimalism, which urges the judiciary to decide
cases on narrow grounds, discourage clear rules, and avoid final definitive
resolution of constitutional matters. See Cass R. Sunstein, ONE CASE AT A TIME:
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 26-37, 259-63 (1999). His
theory furthers the interest of participatory democracy insofar as it encourages
the judiciary to promote democratic deliberation among the people and in the
legislatures. Id.
60. According to scholars, there are several areas of law in need of urgent
attention, including: (1) sovereign immunity, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1480 (1987) ("It is no wonder
the Court's Eleventh Amendment case law is incoherent; in law, as in logic,
anything can be derived from a contradiction. All we are left with is an ad hoc
mishmash of Young and Edelman, of full remedy and state sovereignty, of
supremacy and immunity, of law and lawlessness. The icon of the federal
courthouse open to remedy all constitutional wrongs gives way to a burlesque
image of a doctrinal obstacle course on the courthouse steps."); (2) takings, see
Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993) ("Throughout
constitutional jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can compete seriously
with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle prize.");
(3) separation of powers, see Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1517 (1991) ("Unanimity among
constitutional scholars is all but unheard of. Perhaps when achieved it should be
celebrated. But one point on which the literature has spoken virtually in unison
is no cause for celebration: the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional
separation of powers is an incoherent muddle."); (4) preemption, see Thomas A.
Barnico, The Road from Burma: State Boycotts After Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 89, 102 (2001) ("The proper presumption (if
any) against or in favor of preemption will grow in importance with the rise of
global trade and trade agreements. Many more state and local laws will touch
on foreign affairs in the future, through selective purchasing, divestment, and the
regulation and taxation of international trade. The Supreme Court will
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not be seamless in any area of the law, establishment jurisprudence
appears to at least equal if not surpass all others in its incoherence.
This is evident when surveying case law on varied establishment
issues, such as the use of public funds for religious instruction, the
display of religious symbols and, among others, the appropriation
of funds from general revenues to religious institutions.
eventually need to resolve the proper standard of review for claims of
preemption in this important area."); (5) interstate commerce, see S. Mohsin
Reza, Comment, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno: An Escape from the Dormant
Commerce Clause Quagmire?, 40 U. RICH. L. REv. 1229, 1238 (2006)
(describing dormant Commerce Clause case law and stating that "it is necessary
to analyze the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of discrimination and
the dormant Commerce Clause, a field of law that has been, perhaps justifiably,
described as a 'mess' and a 'quagmire'); (6) jurisdiction, see Friedrich K.
Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 117
(1998) ("The American delegation is also in an unenviable position because
American jurisdictional law is simply not fit for export .... In contrast to not
only civil law nations but also other common law countries, to this day we lack a
rational catalog of jurisdictional bases . . . . In consequence of well over a
century of experimentation and vacillation, we are stuck with a confused,
unwieldy and, at times, unfair Supreme Court case law . . . . Instead of
reasonably clear and cogent provisions, as they are found throughout the
civilized world, we rely on a jumble of state long-arm statutes and Supreme
Court case law that is chaotic and incoherent.") (citations omitted); (7) maritime
jurisdiction, see Lawrence D. Bradley, Jr., The Supreme Court and Maritime
Jurisdiction, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. 207, 244 (2000) ("The Supreme Court could
easily work itself out from under 'the mess' it has created, and the sooner it does
the better."); (8) public assistance benefits, see Charles R. Bogle, Note,
"Unconscionable" Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public
Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 195 (1994) ("In addition, the case
law on this issue is notoriously incoherent; the standards the Supreme Court
claims to be using when evaluating restrictive conditions escape easy definition
and are not applied uniformly across cases involving different types of
assistance or rights. In an area of the law of such crucial importance to the
recipients of the assistance, the Court's doctrine cries out for clarification."); (9)
environment, see Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and
Change: An Eco-Pragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental
Law, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 202 (2006) ("Ironically, if any area of
environmental law should be tailored specifically to address ecological
concerns, it is pesticide law, where substances intended to kill and disrupt
species and natural systems are intentionally released into the environment in
large quantities. Moreover, pesticide law has failed to keep pace with recent
advances in ecology and conservation biology."); and among others (10)
antitrust, see Robert H. Klonoff, Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts,
11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1, 26 (2005) ("The deep conflicts described in this
article have persisted for many years, and it is highly unlikely that the lower
courts will resolve these conflicts on their own. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
will need to resolve these issues.").
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A. The Establishment Labyrinth
Consider a brief journey through the establishment labyrinth.
According to the Court's jagged establishment jurisprudence on
the appropriation of state funds for religious instruction, it is an
impermissible establishment of religion for the state to reimburse
parents for a portion of expenses incurred for their children's
tuition expenses at religious schools,6 1 just as it is to give an annual
tax break to parents whose annual income exceeds the eligibility
criteria for tuition reimbursement. 62 On the other hand, it does not
constitute an establishment of religion for a state either to absorb
tuition charges for students attending religious schools 63 or to
authorize income tax deductions for tuition, textbook, and
transportation expenses incurred by parents in sending their
children to religious schools.
64
Also in the field of denominational instruction, the Court has
both approved 65 and invalidated 66 a "released time" program
allowing public school students to attend religious instruction
conducted by private teachers. It appears that such a program may
simultaneously constitute and not constitute an unlawful
establishment of religion. Likewise, the Court has both approved
67
and invalidated 68 a state program authorizing the use of federal
funds to place public school teachers and social workers in
parochial schools to teach courses in remedial reading, remedial
mathematics, and to administer guidance services and English as a
second language.
Yet the Court has left no doubt that a statute forbidding public
schools from teaching the theory of evolution is an establishment
of religion, 69 just as it would be an impermissible establishment of
religion to create a special school district for a religious enclave.
70
It is not an establishment of religion, however, to extend state
financial assistance to either a blind student attending a private
61. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
62. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
63. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
64. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
65. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
66. I11. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
67. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
68. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
69. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968).
70. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994).
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religious school in preparation for a career in religious ministry,71
or a deaf student in need of sin-language interpretation attending
a denominational high school.
The Court's incoherent and seemingly arbitrary case law on the
use of public funds for instructional material at religious schools
also leaves observers pondering what precisely represents an
impermissible establishment of religion. Consider that the Court
has declared that it is not an impermissible establishment of
religion for a state to provide government aid in the form of school
materials and equipment to religious books.73 But the Court has
also said the very opposite-that it is an establishment of religion
for a state to provide government aid in the form of school
materials and equipment to religious schools.74 Moreover, the
Court has ruled that a state does not impermissibly establish a
religion when it requires public school officials to loan textbooks
free of charge to religious school students.75  The Court has
similarly undercut itself by creating a curious exception to this
rule-that a state sometimes does not impermissibly establish a
religion when it authorizes loans of textbooks and instructional
materials to religious students.76
Administrative matters have also presented a difficulty for the
Supreme Court. Consider that it is not an establishment of religion
for a state to ensure, through an auditing process, that
denominational schools have been reimbursed only for the actual
costs of administering secular services.77 Yet the Court has
invalidated as an establishment of religion a state program
reimbursing denominational schools for expenses incurred in
performing administrative functions, such as maintaining and
reporting records on student enrollment.78 The Court has also
stated that it is an establishment of religion to reimburse
denominational schools for keeping student records and
administering certain tests, both of which were requirements
pursuant to state law.7 9 Thus, curiously, it is an establishment of
71. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
72. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
73. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
74. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
75. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
76. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
77. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980).
78. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973).
79. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
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religion to reimburse denominational schools for administering
secular services, but it is not an establishment of religion to audit
reimbursements to denominational schools for administering
secular services-the very form of reimbursements that the Court
has identified as an establishment of religion. It is equally peculiar
that religious schools may be subject to state registration and
reporting requirements, but religious organizations are shielded
from such requirements because subjecting them to administrative
requirements similar to the ones imposed upon religious schools
would create an establishment of religion.
8 0
With respect to religious symbols, it is an unlawful
establishment of religion for a state to require the Ten
Commandments to hang on public school classroom walls.8 ' It is
also an establishment of religion for a city to feature a creche
display to commemorate Christmas,8 2 but it is not an establishment
of religion for a city to erect a nativity scene to celebrate
Christmas.
83
Government grants are an equally inconsistent segment of
establishment jurisprudence. Although religious high schools may
not be reimbursed for the cost of administering secular services
required by the state because doing so would give rise to an
establishment of religion, religious colleges and universities may
duly receive state administrative and other assistance in issuing
revenue bonds for fundraising purposes without incurring the risk
of establishing a religion. 8  Religious institutions of higher
education may also lawfully apply for and obtain federal
construction grants.8 5 But, when a state disburses an annual grant
to all schools based upon student enrollment, religious schools may
not be credited for enrolling students in a seminarian or theological
program because that would constitute an unconstitutional
establishment of religion.
8 6
With respect to taxes, it is an impermissible establishment of
religion to exempt religious periodicals from sales tax,87 but it is
not an impermissible establishment of religion when property tax
exemptions are granted to properties used for religious worship. 88
80. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
81. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
82. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
83. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
84. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
85. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
86. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
87. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
88. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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This review is not to suggest that the Court's entire repertoire
of establishment decisions is filled with inconsistencies. On the
contrary, the Court has spoken in one melodious voice on several
establishment issues. For instance, with respect to the delegative
powers of religious institutions, the Court has decidedly held that it
is an establishment of religion to authorize a church to exercise
what amounts to a veto that blocks a business from receiving a
liquor license if it is located within a 500-foot radius of the
objecting church.89 There is similarly no ambiguity as to what is
or is not an establishment of religion when it comes to Sabbath
observance. Where a state legislates that employees may refuse
for religious purposes to work on their chosen day of rest, there is
no question, according to the Court, that such a statute rises to the
level of an impermissible establishment of religion. 90
Likewise, contrary to the muddled waters traversed above on
the subject of state reimbursements relating to religious schools-
whether the reimbursement takes the form of vouchers, tax
exemptions, or otherwise--calm waters await those who would
navigate the Court's jurisprudence on school transportation
expenses for denominational schools. For instance, the
Establishment Clause permits a state to reimburse parents from
public funds for the cost of sending their children by bus to
religious schools. 91 It is, likewise, tolerable for a state to authorize
public assistance to religious schools for transportation on field
trips.
Furthermore, no such ambiguity prevails on school prayer and
religious invocations. It is an establishment of religion to expect
public school students to recite aloud a morning prayer,93 just as it
is to insist on Bible readings at the opening of the school day.
94
Moreover, public school teachers cannot hold a one-minute period
of silence for voluntary student prayer because that would create
an establishment of religion. 95 Even permitting student-initiated
and student-led prayer before high school athletic contests risks
establishing a religion.96 It should thus come as no surprise that an
establishment of religion would follow were a public school
principal to invite a rabbi to deliver a commencement prayer.
97
89. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.; 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
90. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
91. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
92. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
93. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
94. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
95. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
96. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
97. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Similarly, under the Court's establishment jurisprudence on
access to public facilities for religious purposes, what constitutes
an establishment of religion is not as ambiguous as other
establishment issues. For instance, it is not an establishment of
religion for a public university to allow registered religious student
groups to use its facilities. 98 Nor is it an establishment of religion
for district residents to use school district buildings for religious
activities, including Bible lessons and prayer.
99
B. The Establishment Edifice
What emerges from this survey of establishment jurisprudence
is an uninspiring portrait of the wobbly constitutional edifice
erected in part by the Supreme Court. It would be unfair to
characterize the Court's establishment case law as unprincipled. It
is not. The conflicted case law is instead the result of the Court's
valiant efforts over the years to distinguish and reconcile divergent
state constitutional provisions on religion and establishment
precedent from the founding era-constitutional provisions and
precedent that are often diametrically opposed to themselves. The
Court's early pronouncements on the Establishment Clause came
at a time of uncertainty about the proper role of religion in the
public square. The new nation-and also the Court, which of
course was not insulated from the national current-had not yet
resolved whether religion and religious conviction in the public
square was something to embrace or eschew.
Specifically, it could not be said whether it was more prudent
to protect the public square from the prospect of divisive religious
beliefs-which could work irreparable harm upon the
impressionable young nation-or to foster open discourse in the
public square among and between peoples of different faith
traditions, which, quite apart from their dissimilar means and ends,
share in common the language of peace and could conceivably
unite divergent faith traditions. Both strands of this issue have
survived to the present day, and continue to inform the Court's
establishment jurisprudence. Had the Court managed to square
these two views in its early jurisprudence, perhaps the
Establishment Clause-and indeed American constitutional law-
would have been better served as a matter of predictable
lawmaking and constitutional interpretation.
98. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
99. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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IV. EARLY ESTABLISHMENT HISTORY
As it stands, establishment history-and, as a result,
establishment jurisprudence-is unsettled. Scholars have argued
in an equally persuasive manner in favor of two conflicting theses:
(1) the founders intended to strictly separate religion from the
mechanisms of the state; and (2) the founders were a deeply
religious people who believed that religion and government should
work symbiotically to advance the aims of the new nation.'00 This
disputed and disputable history of the Establishment Clause may
certainly be one source of the current establishment labyrinth.'
But the unevenness of modem establishment jurisprudence is
perhaps more squarely the product of a correspondingly uneven
process of disestablishment in the several states during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Disestablishment is the
eradication of religious preferences 0 2  or, more narrowly,
disentangling the religious from public authorities.' °3 When the
original thirteen American colonies enshrined the principle of
disestablishment in their respective state constitutions, many of
them still retained a distinctly religious spirit, not only in form, but
also in fact. In the first section below, I review the process of
disestablishment in the states to show that religion was never really
removed from the public sphere. In the second section to follow, I
demonstrate that the Supreme Court's early establishment case law
100. Compare Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America's
Historical Experience with Church and State, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 475, 476-78
(2004) (arguing that religion was viewed as indispensable to effective civil
government), with Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-
3, 14-4 (1978) (arguing that framers intended to separate church from state in
order to ensure effectiveness of civil government).
101. John E. Joiner, Note, A Page or a Volume of Logic?: Reassessing the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 73 DENV. U. L. REv.
507, 507 (1996) ("Nonetheless, history may be as poor a barometer of the
Clause's intended scope as are the Court's inconsistent decisions. Indeed, the
history of the Establishment Clause is not only confusing, but mired in minutiae
and readily manipulated. Unwary jurists consistently fall prey to its simple
deceptiveness and overlook its unquantifiable complexity. The ominous result
is an Establishment Clause jurisprudence which is one-sided and distorted, a
jurisprudence without substance and historical support.").
102. E.g., Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A
Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REv. 551, 557 n.28 (1998); Stuart
D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion Clauses, 25
CUMB. L. REv. 247, 252 n.30 (1995).
103. Mark D. McGarvie, Creating Roles for Religion and Philanthropy in a
Secular Nation: The Dartmouth College Case and the Design of Civil Society in
the Early Republic, 25 J.C. & U.L. 527, 529 (1999).
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mirrored the reluctance of the former colonies to fully and actually
separate church from state.
A. Disestablishment in the Several States
Most of the American colonies exhibited establishmentarian
features during the revolutionary era 10 4 and into the period of
constitutional ratification.105 But, the American declaration of
independence from the British Crown triggered a gradual
movement toward disestablishment, beginning with four colonies
in 1776, and one each in 1777 and 1786.106 The United States Bill
of Rights accelerated the pace of disestablishment through 1833,
the year when the last American state officially ended its
constitutional culture of religious preferences. 10 7 What emerges
from a review of disestablishment in the several states is that the
process of actual disestablishment was rarely ever complete.'
0 8
Indeed, even after official disestablishment by constitutional
amendment, there often remained vestiges of establishment in the
states' respective constitutional instruments.
0 9
Consider first the four states that officially disestablished
religion in 1776: Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Delaware. Maryland established the Church of England in
1702,10 but later disestablished the Church in its Constitution of
1776." Maryland's 1776 Constitution officially ordered the
separation of church and religious authorities, while at the same
time guaranteed religious liberty only to Christians and authorized
the Maryland state legislature to impose a tax in support of
Christianity."12 Both of these provisions lay to bare the enduring
104. Levy, supra note 6, at 1.
105. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was
Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347, 2351 (1997) (explaining that
established churches had become "features of the American landscape" in the
late eighteenth century).




110. See Michael S. Ariens & Robert A. Destro, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 58 (1996).
111. Sanford H. Cobb, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 504 (2d prtg. 1970).
112. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIII:
That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as
he thinks most acceptable to him; all persons, professing the Christian
religion, are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty;
wherefore no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or
estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his
2006]
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vestiges of the state's official sanction of the Church of England.
Indeed, despite purporting to disestablish Christianity in 1776,
Maryland's Constitution limited public office to those who
declared a belief in the Christian religion:
That no other test or qualification ought to be required, on
admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of
support and fidelity to this State, and such oath of office, as
shall be directed by this Convention, or the Legislature of
this State and a declaration of a belief in the Christian
religion.
A similar disconnect is discernible in New Jersey. The state is
said to have preserved religious liberty for its citizens at all
times. 114  It also freely extended to its citizens the freedom of
religion and conscience, 115 and forbade any establishment of
religious practice; unless, under colour of religion, any man shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the
laws or morality, or injure others, in their natural, civil, or religious
rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain, or
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any particular place of
worship, or any particular ministry; yet the Legislature may, in their
-discretion, lay a general and equal tax, for the support of the Christian
religion; leaving to each individual the power of appointing the
payment over of the money, collected from him, to the support of any
particular place of worship or minister; or for the benefit of the poor of
his own denomination, or the poor in general of any particular county:
but the churches, chapels, glebes, and all other property now belonging
to the church of England, ought to remain to the church of England
forever. And all acts of Assembly, lately passed, for collecting moneys
for building or repairing particular churches or chapels of ease, shall
continue in force, and be executed, unless the Legislature shall, by act,
supersede or repeal the same: but no county court shall assess any
quantity of tobacco, or sum of money, hereafter, on the application of
any vestry-men or church-wardens; and every encumbent of the church
of England, who hath remained in his parish, and performed his duty,
shall be entitled to receive the provision and support established by the
act, entitled "An act for the support of the clergy of the church of
England, in this Province," till the November court of this present year,
to be held for the county in which his parish shall lie, or partly lie, or
for such time as he hath remained in his parish, and performed his duty.
113. Id. art. XXXV.
114. See Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 58.
115. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII:
That no person shall ever, within this Colony, be deprived of the
inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; nor, under any pretence
whatever, be compelled to attend any place of worship, contrary to his
own faith and judgment; nor shall any person, within this Colony, ever
[Vol. 67
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religion in its constitution."16 But the New Jersey Constitution did
impose a religious test for public office that limited office-holding
to Protestants." 7  This test survived well into the nineteenth
century. 118
The same inconsistency is evident in early North Carolina,
which established the Church of England in 1711.119 The
Constitution of 1776 extended -religious freedom to all North
Carolinians, stating "[t]hat all men have a natural and unalienable
right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences." 120  It also prohibited an establishment of
religion. 121 But the virtue of these proscriptions was undermined
be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of
building or repairing any other church or churches, place or places of
worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to
what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or voluntarily engaged
himself to perform.
116. Id. art. XIX:
That there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in this
Province, in preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant of
this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles; but that all persons, professing a
belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves
peaceably under the government, as hereby established, shall be
capable of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a
member of either branch of the Legislature, and shall fully and freely
enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow
subjects.
117. Id.
That there shall be no establishment of any one religious sect in this
Province, in preference to another; and that no Protestant inhabitant of
this Colony shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely on
account of his religious principles; but that all persons, professing a
belief in the faith of any Protestant sect, who shall demean themselves
peaceably under the government, as hereby established, shall be
capable of being elected into any office of profit or trust, or being a
member of either branch of the Legislature, and shall fully and freely
enjoy every privilege and immunity, enjoyed by others their fellow
subjects.
118. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. I, § 4 ("There shall be no establishment of one
religious sect in preference to another; no religious test shall be required as a
qualification for any office or public trust; and no person shall be denied the
enjoyment of any civil right merely on account of his religious principles.").
119. See Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 59.
120. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX.
121. Id. art. XXXIV:
That there shall be no establishment of any one religious church or
denomination in this State, in preference to any other; neither shall any
person, on any pretence whatsoever, be compelled to attend any place
of worship contrary to his own faith or judgment, nor be obliged to pay,
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by the state's religious test for public office. 22  The test was
repealed much later in 1835.123
Of these four early disestablishment states, Delaware is the
exception because the state did not convey an ambiguous statement
about the place of religion in public life. While Delaware's
Charter of 1701 may have afforded religious liberty only to
Christians, 124 its Constitution of 1776 did in fact impose a
for the purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of worship,
or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he
believes right, or has voluntarily and personally engaged to perform;
but all persons shall be at liberty to exercise their own mode of
worship: -Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed
to exempt preachers of treasonable or seditious discourses, from legal
trial and punishment.
122. Id. art. XXXII:
That no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the
Protestant religion, or the divine authority either of the Old or New
Testaments, or who shall hold religious principles incompatible with
the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of holding any
office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State.
123. Id. art. IV, § 4 (amended 1835).
124. CHARTER OF DELAWARE (1701). First:
BECAUSE no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest
Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their
Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship: And
Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and
Spirits; and the Author as well as Object of all divine knowledge, Faith
and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and
convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare,
That no Person or Persons, inhabiting In this Province or Territories,
who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty God, the Creator,
Upholder and Ruler of the World; and professes him or themselves
obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any
Case molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of
his or their consciencious Persuasion or Practice, nor be compelled to
frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary
to his or their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary
to their religious Persuasion.
AND that all Persons who also profess to believe in Jesus Christ, the
Saviour of the World, shall be capable (notwithstanding their other
Persuasions and Practices in Point of Conscience and Religion) to serve
this Government in any Capacity, both legislatively and executively, he
or they solemnly promising, when lawfully required, Allegiance to the
King as Sovereign, and Fidelity to the Proprietary and Governor, and
taking the Attests as now established by the Law made at Newcastle, in
the Year One Thousand and Seven Hundred, entituled, An Act directing
the Attests of several Officers and Ministers, as now amended and
confirmed this present Assembly.
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Christian test on prospective officeholders. 125  However,
Delaware's Constitution of 1792 eliminated religious tests 126 and
reaffirmed disestablishment without any concomitant haziness.'
27
Delaware was thus unmistakable in its intent to separate church
from state.
The next four states to disestablish their respective churches
were New York in 1777, Virginia in 1786, South Carolina in 1790,
and Georgia in 1798. Whereas three of the first four colonies to
disestablish-Maryland, New Jersey, and North Carolina-
exhibited some traces of establishment, three of the colonies in this
second foursome demonstrated a clearer commitment to
disestablishment. Only one state in the second group-New
York-sent conflicting signals about the state's official support or
preference for a particular religious denomination.
New York's Church of England establishments were abolished
in the New York Constitution of 1777.128 The constitution did so
in unmistakable terms, leaving no doubt as to the obsolete status of
previous establishments under the new constitutional regime.'
29
125. DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22:
Every person who shall be chosen a member of either house, or
appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or
entering upon the execution of his office, shall take the following oath,
or affirmation, if conscientiously scrupulous of taking an oath, to wit:
"I, A B, will bear true allegiance to the Delaware State, submit to its
constitution and laws, and do no act wittingly whereby the freedom
thereof may be prejudiced."
And also make and subscribe the following declaration, to wit:
"I, A B, do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His
only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I
do acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to
be given by divine inspiration."
And all officers shall also take an oath of office.
126. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 2 ("No religious test shall be required as a
qualification to any office, or public trust under this State.").
127. Id. art. I, § 1:
Although it is the duty of all men frequently to assemble together for
the public worship of the Author of the universe, and piety and
morality, on which the prosperity of communities depends, are thereby
promoted; yet no man shall or ought to be compelled to attend any
religious worship, to contribute to the erection or support of any place
of worship, or to the maintenance of any ministry, against his own free
will and consent; and no power shall or ought to be vested in or
assumed by any magistrate that shall in any case interfere with, or in
any manner control, the rights of conscience, in the free exercise of
religious worship, nor a preference be given by law to any religious
societies, denominations, or modes of worship.
128. See Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 57.
129. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV:
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New York also constitutionalized the right to religious freedom
and broadly condemned religious intolerance.' 30 But Catholics did
not enjoy this expansive protection of religious liberty, as they
And this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority of
the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare that such
parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law of England
and Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of
New York, as together did form the law of the said colony on the 19th
day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and
seventy-five, shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such
alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State shall, from
time to time, make concerning the same. That such of the said acts, as
are temporary, shall expire at the times limited for their duration
respectively. That all such parts of the said common law, and all such
of the said statutes and acts aforesaid, or parts thereof, as may be
construed to establish or maintain any particular denomination of
Christians or their ministers, or concern the allegiance heretofore
yielded to, and the supremacy, sovereignty, government, or
prerogatives claimed or exercised by, the King of Great Britain and his
predecessors, over the colony of New York and its inhabitants, or are
repugnant to this constitution, be, and they hereby are, abrogated and
rejected. And this convention doth further ordain, that the resolves or
resolutions of the congresses of the colony of New York, and of the
convention of the State of New York, now in force, and not repugnant
to the government established by this constitution, shall be considered
as making part of the laws of this State; subject, nevertheless, to such
alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State may, from time
to time, make concerning the same.
130. Id. art. XXXVIII:
And whereas we are required, by the benevolent principles of rational
liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that
spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and
ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged
mankind, this convention doth further, in the name and by the authority
of the good people of this State, ordain, determine, and declare, that the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be
allowed, within this State, to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of
conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this State.
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were shunned across the state l l and effectively banned from
holding public office until 1806.132
By the time of the American Revolution, the Church of
England was the established church in Virginia.' 33  In 1776,
Virginia adopted a bill of rights that guaranteed religious freedom,
but, nonetheless, held Christianity in special regard. 134 Later, in
1779, Virginia repealed a law that had previously authorized state-
subsidized salaries for Church of England clergy.' 35 In 1786, the
Virginia Assembly passed Thomas Jefferson's Act Establishing
Religious Freedom, which officially disestablished the Church of
England. 1
36
131. The New York Constitution of 1777 required prospective citizens to
"abjure and renounce all allegiance and subjection to all and every foreign king,
prince, potentate, and State in all matters, ecclesiastical as well as civil." Id. art.
XLII. One scholar believes this provision to have been intended to discourage
Catholics from settling in New York. Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 58
(quoting John Webb Pratt, RELIGION, POLITICS, AND DIVERSITY: THE CHURCH-
STATE THEME IN NEW YORK HISTORY 95 (1967)).
132. Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 58.
133. Id. at 61.
134. VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 16:
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practise Christian
forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
135. Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 63.
136. AN ACT ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1786):
Well aware that the opinions and belief of men depend on their own
will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds; that
Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme
will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of
restraint; that all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments, or
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy
author of our religion, who being lord both of body and mind, yet chose
not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty
power to do, but to exalt it by its influence on reason alone; that the
impious presumption of legislature and ruler, civil as well as
ecclesiastical, who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men,
have assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their own
opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and infallible, and as
such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath established and
maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world and
through all time: That to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and
abhors, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of
the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular
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For its part, South Carolina underwent a significant
transformation between the American Revolution and the period of
pastor whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he
feels most persuasive to righteousness; and is withdrawing from the
ministry those temporary rewards, which proceeding from an
approbation of their of their personal conduct, are an additional
incitement to earnest and unremitting labours for the instruction of
mankind; that our civil rights have no dependence on our religious
opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry; and
therefore the proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence
by laying upon him incapacity of being called to offices of trust or
emolument, unless he profess or renounce this or that religious opinion,
is depriving him injudiciously of those privileges and advantages to
which, in common with his fellow-citizens, he has a natural right; that
it tends also to corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to
encourage, by bribing with a monopoly of worldly honours and
emoluments, those who will externally profess and conform to it; that
though indeed these are criminals who do not withstand such
temptation, yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait in their way;
that the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor
under its jurisdiction; that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his
powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a
dangerous fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty, because
he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the
rule of judgement, and approve or condemn the sentiments of others
only as they shall square with or suffer from his own; that it is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and
good order; and finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to
herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has
nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition
disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them.
We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, or shall otherwise suffer, on account of
his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and
that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
liberties.
And though we well know that this Assembly, elected by the people
for their ordinary purposes of legislation only, have no power to
restrain the acts of succeeding Assemblies, constituted with powers
equal to our own, and that therefore to declare this act to be irrevocable
would be of no effect in law; yet we are free to declare, and do declare,
that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and
that if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present or to
narrow its operations, such act will be an infringement of natural right.
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the drafting of the Bill of Rights. The 1778 Constitution of South
Carolina established Christian Protestantism as the official
religion.' 37  But, in 1790, South Carolina adopted a new
137. S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII:
That all persons and religious societies who acknowledge that there is
one God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and that God
is publicly to be worshipped, shall be freely tolerated. The Christian
Protestant religion shall be deemed, and is hereby constituted and
declared to be, the established religion of this State. That all
denominations of Christian Protestants in this State, demeaning
themselves peaceably and faithfully, shall enjoy equal religious and
civil privileges. To accomplish this desirable purpose without injury to
the religious property of those societies of Christians which are by law
already incorporated for the purpose of religious worship, and to put it
fully into the power of every other society of Christian Protestants,
either already formed or hereafter to be formed, to obtain the like
incorporation, it is hereby constituted, appointed, and declared that the
respective societies of the Church of England that are already formed in
this State for the purpose of religious worship shall still continue
incorporate and hold the religious property now in their possession.
And that whenever fifteen or more male persons, not under twenty-one
years of age, professing the Christian Protestant religion, and agreeing
to unite themselves In a society for the purposes of religious worship,
they shall, (on complying with the terms hereinafter mentioned,) be,
and be constituted a church, and be esteemed and regarded in law as of
the established religion of the State, and on a petition to the legislature
shall be entitled to be incorporated and to enjoy equal privileges. That
every society of Christians so formed shall give themselves a name or
denomination by which they shall be called and known in law, and all
that associate with them for the purposes of worship shall be esteemed
as belonging to the society so called. But that previous to the
establishment and incorporation of the respective societies of every
denomination as aforesaid, and in order to entitle them thereto, each
society so petitioning shall have agreed to and subscribed in a book the
following five articles, without which no agreement fir union of men
upon presence of religion shall entitle them to be incorporated and
esteemed as a church of the established religion of this State:
I st. That there is one eternal God, and a future state of rewards and
punishments.
2d. That God is publicly to be worshipped.
3d. That the Christian religion is the true religion.
4th. That the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are of
divine inspiration, and are the rule of faith and practice.
5th. That it is lawful and the duty of every man being thereunto called
by those that govern, to bear witness to the truth.
And that every inhabitant of this State, when called to make an appeal
to God as a witness to truth, shall be permitted to do it in that way
which is most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience. And that
the people of this State may forever enjoy the right of electing their
own pastors or clergy, and at the same time that the State may have
sufficient security for the due discharge of the pastoral office, by those
who shall be admitted to be clergymen, no person shall officiate as
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constitution, which abolished the state's establishment of the
Christian Protestant religion.' 38 The new constitution also decreed
genuine freedom of religion for South Carolinians. 13
9
Georgia provides an example of "soft" establishment, which is
the public support of religion alongside the promise of religious
minister of any established church who shall not have been chosen by a
majority of the society to which he shall minister, or by persons
appointed by the said majority, to choose and procure a minister for
them; nor until the minister so chosen and appointed shall have made
and subscribed to the following declaration, over and above the
aforesaid five articles, viz: "That he is determined by God's grace out
of the holy scriptures, to instruct the people committed to his charge,
and to teach nothing as required of necessity to eternal salvation but
that which he shall be persuaded may be concluded and proved from
the scripture; that he will use both public and private admonitions, as
well to the sick as to the whole within his cure, as need shall require
and occasion shall be given, and that he will be diligent in prayers, and
in reading of the same; that he will be diligent to frame and fashion his
own self and his family according to the doctrine of Christ, and to make
both himself and them, as much as in him lieth, wholesome examples
and patterns to the flock of Christ; that he will maintain and set
forwards, as much as he can, quietness, peace, and love among all
people, and especially among those that are or shall be committed to
lids charge. No person shall disturb or molest any religious assembly;
nor shall use any reproachful, reviling, or abusive language against any
church, that being the certain way of disturbing the peace, and of
hindering the conversion of any to the truth, by engaging them in
quarrels and animosities, to the hatred of the professors, and that
profession which otherwise they might be brought to assent to. No
person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly
irreverently or seditiously of the government of this State. No person
shall, by law, be obliged to pay towards the maintenance and support of
a religious worship that he does not freely join in, or has not voluntarily
engaged to support. But the churches, chapels, parsonages, globes, and
all other property now belonging to any societies of the Church of
England, or any other religious societies, shall remain and be secured to
them forever. The poor shall be supported, and elections managed in
the accustomed manner, until laws shall be provided to adjust those
matters in the most equitable way.
138. See Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 60.
139. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. VIII, § 1:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed
within this State to all mankind: Provided, That the liberty of
conscience thereby declared shall not be so construed as to excuse acts
of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of this State.
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tolerance and pluralism. 140  In the case of colonial Georgia, the
promise of religious tolerance and pluralism was qualified because
all but Catholics enjoyed religious freedom under the Charter of
1732.' a' The state established the Church of England in 1758,142
which was disestablished in 1777.143 Yet in the same year,
Georgia also imposed a Protestant test on elected officials.'P4 A
few years later, a Georgia statute revealed the extent to which
Christianity remained dominant in civil society, stating that "the
Christian religion redounded to the benefit of society, 'its regular
establishment and support is among the most important objects of
legislative determination. ' 145 It was not until 1789 that the state
expressly prohibited any establishment of religion. 1
46
The next three states to disestablish-Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Massachusetts-each appeared unable or
unwilling to make a definitive break with its establishmentarian
past. It was long after each state had officially discontinued ties
140. Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the Thirteenth Colony: Church-
State Relations in Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1693, 1697-98 (2005).
141. CHARTER OF GEORGIA (1732):
And for the greater ease and encouragement of our loving subjects
and such others as shall come to inhabit in our said colony, we do by
these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, grant, establish and
ordain, that forever hereafter, there shall be a liberty of conscience
allowed in the worship of God, to all persons inhabiting, or which shall
inhabit or be resident within our said province, and that all such
persons, except papists, shall have a free exercise of their religion, so
that they be contented with the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of the
same, not giving offence or scandal to the government.
142. See Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 60.
143. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI:
All persons whatever shall have the free exercise of their religion;
provided it be not repugnant to the peace and safety of the State; and
shall not, unless by consent, support any teacher or teachers except
those of their own profession.
144. Id art. VI ("The representatives ... shall be of the Protestant religion. ..
145. Thomas J. Curry, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 153 (1986).
146. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10:
No person within this State shall, upon any pretence, be deprived of
the inestimable privilege of worshipping God in a manner agreeable to
his own conscience, nor be compelled to attend any place of worship
contrary to his own faith and judgment; nor shall he ever be obliged to
pay tithes, taxes, or any other rate, for the building or repairing any
place of worship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry,
contrary to what he believes to be right, or hath voluntarily engaged to
do. No one religious society shall ever be established in this State, in
preference to another; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of
any civil right merely on account of his religious principles.
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between the state and religion that this actually happened as a
matter of practice.
Consider, first, Connecticut. Colonial Connecticut established
Congregationalism as the state religion. 147  In 1776, the
Connecticut Constitution stated an unequivocal preference for
Christianity. 14  This was a reaffirmation of the Connecticut
Charter of 1662, which had phrased the mission of Connecticut as
"[w]in[ning] and invit[ing] the Natives of the Country to the
Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD, and the Saviour
of Mankind, and the Christian Faith, which in Our Royal
Intentions, and the adventurers free Possession, is the only and
principal End of this Plantation.' ' 149  In 1818, Connecticut
officially disestablished Congregationalism and repealed its
religious preferences by way of a new constitution that ensured
religious freedom to all 150 and forbade the establishment of a
Christian religion. 15 1  Nevertheless, the new Connecticut
Constitution imposed a "duty" on all residents "to worship the
Supreme Being."'
152
147. Levy, supra note 6, at 41.
148. CONN. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.:
The People of this State, being by the Providence of God, free and
independent, have the sole and exclusive Right of governing
themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent State; and having
from their Ancestors derived a free and excellent Constitution of
Government whereby the Legislature depends on the free and annual
Election of the People, they have the best Security for the Preservation
of their civil and religious Rights and liberties. And forasmuch as the
free Fruition of such Liberties and Privileges as Humanity, Civility and
Christianity call for, as is due to every Man in his Place and Proportion,
without Impeachment or Infringement, hath ever been, and will be the
Tranquility and Stability of Churches and Commonwealths; and the
Denial thereof, the Disturbance, if not the Ruin of both.
149. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662).
150. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 3 ("The exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to
all persons in this State, provided that the right hereby declared and established
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or to justify
practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the State.").
151. Id. art. I, § 4 ("No preference shall be given by law to any christian sect
or mode of worship.").
152. Id. art. VII, § 1:
It being the duty of all men to worship the Supreme Being, the great
Creator and Preserver of the Universe, and their right to render that
worship in the mode most consistent with the dictates of their
consciences, no person shall by law be compelled to join or support,
nor be classed with, or associated to, any congregation, church, or
religious association; but every person now belonging to such
congregation, church, or religious association, shall remain a member
thereof until he shall have separated himself therefrom, in the manner
[Vol. 67
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In colonial New Hampshire, Congregationalism was
established by law. 153  New Hampshire's Constitution of 1784
preserved the freedom of religion and conscience to its citizens,
yet, nevertheless, retained an explicit preference for
Protestantism. 54  Not much had changed by 1792, when New
Hampshire adopted an altered and amended constitution, which
hereinafter provided. And each and every society or denomination of
Christians in this State shall have and enjoy the same and equal powers,
rights, and privileges; and shall have power and authority to support
and maintain the ministers or teachers of their respective
denominations, and to build and repair houses for public worship by a
tax on the members of any such society only, to be laid by a major vote
of the legal voters assembled at any society meeting, warned and held
according to law, or in any other manner.
153. See Ariens & Destro,supra note 110, at 53.
154. N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. I, §§ V-VI:
Every individual has a nature and unalienable right to worship GOD
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained in his person, liberty or
estate for worshipping GOD, in the manner and season most agreeable
to the dictates of his own conscience, or for his religious profession,
sentiments or persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace,
or disturb others, in their religious worship.
As morality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, will
give the best and greatest security to government, and will lay in the
hearts of men the strongest obligations to due subjection; and as the
knowledge of these, is most likely to be propagated through a society
by the institution of the public worship of the DEITY, and of public
instruction in morality and religion; therefore, to promote those
important purposes, the people of this state have a right to impower,
and do hereby fully impower the legislature to authorize from time to
time, the several towns, parishes, bodies-corporate, or religious
societies within this state, to make adequate provision at their own
expense, for the support and maintenance of public protestant teachers
of piety, religion and morality:
Provided notwithstanding, That the several towns, parishes, bodies-
corporate, or religious societies, shall at all times have the exclusive
right of electing their own public teachers, and of contracting with them
for their support and maintenance. And no person of any one particular
religious sect or denomination, shall ever be compelled to pay toward
the support of the teacher or teachers of another persuasion, sect or
denomination.
And every denomination of Christians demeaning themselves quietly,
and .as good subjects of the state, shall be equally under the protection
of the law: and no subordination of any one sect or denomination to
another, shall ever be established by law.
And nothing herein shall be understood to affect any former contracts
made for the support of the ministry; but all such contracts shall
remain, and be in the same state as if this constitution had not been
made.
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included a bill of rights that remained substantively unaltered. 155
Not until the early nineteenth century did New Hampshire's
official support of religion come to an end at the hands of the
state's new Toleration Act of 18 19.156
The story of Massachusetts is similarly inconsistent.
Authorized under the 1620 Charter of New England,
Massachusetts was settled by dissenters of the Church of
England. 157  The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 enshrined
religious freedom, 158 but, nevertheless, retained a preference for
Protestants. 159 Massachusetts was the last state, in 1833, to fully
155. N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. I, §§ V-VI.
156. Levy, supra note 6, at 45.
157. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1896 (1983).
158. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. II:
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly and at
stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and
Preserver of the universe. And no subject shall be hurt, molested, or
restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments, provided he
doth not disturb the public peace or obstruct others in their religious
worship.
159. Id. art. III:
As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of
civil government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality,
and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by
the institution of the public worship of God and of public instructions
in piety, religion, and morality: Therefore, To promote their happiness
and to secure the good order and preservation of their government, the
people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature
with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time
to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts,
and other bodies-politic or religious societies to make suitable
provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the public worship
of God and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant
teachers of piety, religion, and morality in all cases where such
provision shall not be made voluntarily.
And the people of this commonwealth have also a right to, and do,
invest their legislature with authority to enjoin upon all the subjects an
attendance upon the instructions of the public teachers aforesaid, at
stated times and seasons, if there be any on whose instructions they can
conscientiously and conveniently attend.
Provided, notwithstanding, That the several towns, parishes,
precincts, and other bodies-politic, or religious societies, shall at all
times have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers and of
contracting with them for their support and maintenance.
And all moneys paid by the subject to the support of public worship
and of the public teachers aforesaid shall, if he require it, be uniformly
applied to the support of the public teacher or teachers of his own
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terminate its official state sanction of religion. 160 In that year, the
state amended its constitution to repeal its requirement for taxpayer
support of religion. 16 1 As evidence of the mixed message on the
role of religion in public life in Massachusetts, the state high court
sustained a blasphemy conviction only five years after the state had
ostensibly disestablished the Church. r 62 Blasphemy statutes were a
reflection of the extent to which Christianity had infused the
common law. 1
63
Of the two remaining original colonies-Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island-neither has had an established church. Rhode
Island neither established a denominational church, nor required
religious sect or denomination, provided there be any on whose
instructions he attends; otherwise it may be paid toward the support of
the teacher or teachers of the parish or precinct in which the said
moneys are raised.
And every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves
peaceably and as good subjects of the commonwealth, shall be equally
under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any one sect or
denomination to another shall ever be established by law.
160. Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus Darwin: Examining the History and
Future of the Creationism-Evolution Controversy in American Public Schools, 9
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205,208 (1999).
161. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. III (amended 1833):
As the public worship of God, and the instructions in piety, religion,
and morality, promote the happiness and prosperity of a people, and the
security of a republican government; therefore, the several religious
societies of this commonwealth, whether corporate or unincorporate, at
any meeting legally warned and holden for that purpose, shall ever
have the right to elect their pastors or religious teachers, to contract
with them for their support, to raise money for erecting and repairing
houses for public worship, for the maintenance of religious instruction,
and for the payment of necessary expenses; and all persons belonging
to any religious society shall be taken and held to be members, until
they shall file with the clerk of such society a written notice declaring
the dissolution of their membership, and thenceforth shall not be liable
for any grant or contract which may be thereafter made or entered into
by such society; and all religious sects and denominations, demeaning
themselves peaceably and as good citizens of the commonwealth, shall
be equally under the protection of the law; and no subordination of any
one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by law.
162. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206 (1838); Sarah Barringer
Gordon, "Our National Hearthstone": Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the
Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE
J.L. & HuMAN. 295, 337 (1996).
163. G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 88
(1989) ("State courts continued to recognize Christianity as part of the common
law and to sustain convictions for blasphemy when speakers disparaged
Christian beliefs.").
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compulsory church attendance.' 64 Its founding Charter of 1663 is
a model of religious freedom. 165 Rhode Island did not draft a new
constitution until 1842.166 The constitution drew its guiding
164. Isaac A. Cornelison, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 64 (2d prtg. 1970).
165. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVINCE PLANTATIONS (1663):
[A]nd whereas, in theire humble addresse, they have ffreely declared,
that it is much on their hearts (if they may be permitted), to hold forth a
livelie experiment, that a most flourishing civill state may stand and
best bee maintained, and that among our English subjects, with a full
libertie in religious concernments; and that true pietye rightly grounded
upon gospell principles, will give the best and greatest security to
sovereignetye, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest
obligations to true loyaltye: Now know yee, that wee beinge willinge to
encourage the hopefull understakeinge of oure sayd loyall and loveinge
subjects, and to secure them in the free exercise and enjoyment of all
theire civill and religious rights, appertaining to them, as our loveing
subjects; and to preseve unto them that libertye, in the true Christian
ffaith and worship of God, which they have sought with soe much
travail, and with peaceable myndes, and loyall subjectione to our royall
progenitors and ourselves, to enjoye; and because some of the people
and inhabitants of the same colonie cannot, in theire private opinions,
conforme to the publique exercise of religion, according to the liturgy,
formes and ceremonyes of the Church of England, or take or subscribe
the oaths and articles made and established in this nation: Have
therefore thought ifit, and doe hereby publish, graunt, ordeyne and
declare, That our royall will and pleasure is, that noe person within the
sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise molested,
punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in
opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill
peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye person and persons
may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes hereafter, freely and fullye
have and enjoye his and theire owne judgments and consciences, in
matters of religious concemments, throughout the tract of lande
hereafter mentioned; they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie,
and not using this libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to
the civill injurye or outward disturbeance of others; any lawe, statute,
or clause, therein contained, or to bee contained, usage or custome of
this realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, notwithstanding. And
that they may bee in the better capacity to defend themselves, in theire
just rights and libertyes against all the enemies of the Christian ffaith,
and others, in all respects, wee have further thought fit, and at the
humble petition of the persons afosesayd are gratiously pleased to
declare, That they shall have and enjoye the benefitt of our late act of
indemnity and ffree pardon, as the rest of our subjects in other our
dominions and territoryes have; and to create and make them a bodye
politique or corporate, with the powers and priviledges hereinafter
mentioned. And accordingely our will and pleasure is, and of our
especiall grace, certaine knowledge, and mere motion, wee have
ordeyned, constituted and declared, and by these presents, for us, our
heires and successors, doe ordeyne, constitute and declare ....
166. R.I. CONST. of 1842.
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principles from the original Charter. 167 There is no mixed message
in Rhode Island.
Although Pennsylvania did not have an established church, it,
nonetheless, exhibited some establishmentarian features. In its
early days, the colony had a long history of religious freedom and
denied "the propriety of any religious establishment."'' 6 8  Its
Charter of 1681 guaranteed freedom of religion and conscience,'
6 9
as did its Frame of Government of 1682470 and its Charter of
Privileges of 1701.171 The Constitution of 1776 also safeguarded
freedom of religion and conscience, but, imortantly, only to those
"who acknowledge[d] the being of a God." r72 The Constitution of
167. Ariens & Destro, supra note 110, at 55.
168. Cobb, supra note 111, at 422.
169. CHARTER FOR THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA (1681):
AND Our further pleasure is, and wee doe hereby, for us, our heires
and Successors, charge and require, that if any of the inhabitants of the
said Province, to the number of Twenty, shall at any time hereafter be
desirous, and shall by any writeing, or by any person deputed for them,
signify such their desire to the Bishop of London for the time being that
any preacher or preachers, to be approved of by the said Bishop, may
be sent unto them for their instruction, that then such preacher or
preachers shall and may be and reside within the said Province, without
any denial or molestation whatsoever.
170. FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA of 1682, art. XXXV:
That all persons living in this province, who confess and acknowledge
the one Almighty and eternal God, to be the Creator, Upholder and
Ruler of the world; and that hold themselves obliged in conscience to
live peaceably and justly in civil society, shall, in no ways, be molested
or prejudiced for their religious persuasion, or practice, in matters of
faith and worship, nor shall they be compelled, at any time, to frequent
or maintain any religious worship, place or ministry whatever.
171. CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES FOR PENNSYLVANIA (1701). First:
BECAUSE no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest
Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their
Consciences, as to their Religious Profession and Worship: And
Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and
Spirits; and the Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith
and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and
convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare,
That no Person or Persons, inhabiting in this Province or Territories,
who shall confess and acknowledge One almighty God, the Creator,
Upholder and Ruler of the World; and profess him or themselves
obliged to live quietly under the Civil Government, shall be in any
Case molested or prejudiced, in his or their Person or Estate, because of
his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, nor be compelled to
frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary
to his or their Mind, or to do or suffer any other Act or Thing, contrary
to their religious Persuasion.
172. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II:
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1790 changed very little with regard to religious liberty, 173 but it
did continue the religious requirement for holding public office. 17
4
As demonstrated above, disestablishment in the original
American colonies-tumed-states did not effect a real and complete
separation of religious and public authorities. Quite the contrary,
for states did indeed reveal some measure of solicitude and
partiality for religion, in general, or a given denomination, in
particular-even those states whose constitutional instruments
purported to prohibit designating an official religion or extending
preferences to a religion or denomination. This is significant
because it underscores the degree to which early Americans
struggled to remove religion from the public square. This debate
was not confined to the American masses. Indeed, it reached well
into the highest levels of government. Even the Supreme Court of
the United States found it difficult to reconcile liberal democratic
principles of secularism with the centrality of religion to the lives
of Americans.
B. Early Establishment Doctrine
Early religion jurisprudence makes plain the Court's valiant
effort to interpret and -apply the Establishment Clause. In the early
That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences and
understanding: And that no man ought or of right can be compelled to
attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship,
or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and
consent: Nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, bejustly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of
his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship: And that
no authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power
whatever, that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner
controul, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious
worship.
173. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3:
That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that
no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place
of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent; that no
human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law,
to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
174. Id. art. IX, § 4 ("That no person, who acknowledges the being of a God
and a future state of rewards and punishments, shall, on account of his religious




days of the republic, the Court found itself pulled in opposite
directions by two incompatible, though equally plausible, visions
of the Establishment Clause. The choice facing the Court was
whether to read the Establishment Clause as a necessary protection
against a force-religion-that threatened to exacerbate the
vulnerabilities of the emergent nation, or as an indispensable
instrument to cultivate tolerance and equality among the newly-
partnered peoples of the several 
states.' 7
In its first declaration on the intersection of matters of faith and
the state, the Supreme Court addressed whether a statute
disestablishing the Episcopal Church in Virginia had the
contemporaneous effect of appropriating church properties into the
possession of the state. 176 This was a free exercise case that turned
on statutory construction and principles of property law. Though
the Court did not detail precisely what constituted an
impermissible establishment of religion, its reflection on the
permissible scope of interaction between religious and public
institutions revealed the benevolence with which the Court
regarded the role of religion in early post-colonial America.
In ruling that the state of Virginia could divest the formerly
established Episcopal Church of its property, the Court articulated
the earliest antecedent to the theory of non-preferentialism:
But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to
be restrained by aiding with equal attention to votaries of
every sect to perform their own religious duties, or by
establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public
charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the
sepulture of the dead. And that these purposes could be
better secured and cherished by corporate powers, cannot
be doubted by any person who has attended to the
difficulties which surround all voluntary associations.
While, therefore, the legislature might exempt the citizens
from a compulsive attendance and payment of taxes in
support of any particular sect, it is not perceived that either
public or constitutional principles required the abolition of
all religious corporations. 77
Here, we read the Court's attempt to make a comfortable place
for religion in American public life, one where government may
freely aid religious institutions, just as it may do so in respect of
other organizations that serve the public interest, including
175. See infra this Part.
176. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
177. Id. at 49.
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charities. To do so, the Court unveils the theory of non-
preferentialism. This theory-also known as benevolent
neutrality-holds that the state may favor religion with public
funds while remaining squarely within the bounds of the
Establishment Clause, as long as the state favors all religions
equally without betraying a preference for any particular religion
or religions to the detriment of others. 178 Several modem scholars
have encouraged the Court to adopt non-preferentialism as a policy
more closely in keeing with the original conception of the
Establishment Clause. 79 This stands in contrast to what the Court
today advances as a olicy of strict neutrality toward religion and
religious institutions. 
80
In another early property case, the Court distinguished an
established church from a corporation, noting that an established
church enjoys "peculiar rihts and privileges" dispensed "under the
patronage of the state. '' 1  There was no mention in the case of
what makes an establishment of religion unlawful, but the Court's
choice of words in this early establishment dispute was significant
because they would go on to inform the development of the
Establishment Clause into a sentinel keeping vigil over the affairs
of the state, ensuring that no church or religion enjoyed special
rights or privileges, or the patronage of the state in either form or
substance.
Sixty years later, the Court ruled on one of several polygamy
cases. 18 Again, this was not an establishment case. It was instead
a free exercise case in which the Court authorized Congress to
enact certain rules of action and conscience that forbade the
practice of polygamy. To permit polygamy, writes the Court,
would be "to make the professed doctrines of religious belief
superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself., 183  Under such circumstances,
178. See Derek Davis, ORIGINAL INTENT 48-49 (1991).
179. See generally, e.g., Robert L. Cord, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (1982); Michael J. Malbin, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978).
180. Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality:
The Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57
FLA. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2005).
181. Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 325 (1815) ("The phrase, 'the
church of England,' so familiar in our laws and judicial treatises, is nothing
more than a compendious expression for the religious establishment of the
realm, considered in the aggregate under the superintendence of its spiritual
head. In this sense the church of England is said to have peculiar rights and
privileges, not as a corporation, but as an ecclesiastical institution under the
patronage of the state.").
182. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
183. 1d. at 167.
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"government could exist only in name"' 8 4 and no further. 85
Writing in dicta and commenting on religious establishments
before the American Revolution, the Court offered its first
applicable insight into what constituted an impermissible
establishment of religion:
Before the adoption of the Constitution, attempts were
made in some of the colonies and States to legislate not
only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in
respect to its doctrines and precepts as well. The people
were taxed, against their will, for the support of religion,
and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose
tenets they could not and did not subscribe. Punishments
were prescribed for a failure to attend upon public worship,
and sometimes for entertaining heretical opinions.1
86
This passage traces at least three formative principles that
underpin the early American understanding of a prohibited
establishment of religion: (1) state mandated financial support for
religion; (2) state dispensed penalties for failure to support
religion; and (3) state dispensed penalties for embracing beliefs
contrary to particular religious teachings. Any of these three
conditions were sufficient to invalidate a statute as violative of the
Establishment Clause. And each of these three was, consequently,
regarded as not only unconstitutional, but also damaging to the
health of the burgeoning democracy. What is curious, though, is
that the establishmentarian colonies had widely shared each of
these three features in common prior to disestablishment not too
long before the Court made this fateful declaration.' 87 Thus, in
taking its first steps to chart the meaning of the Establishment
Clause, the Court defined an unlawful establishment of religion in
terms of what had previously been lawful in establishmentarian
colonies.
These early Supreme Court cases begin to hint at the coming
inconsistency that the Court would face in the twentieth century:
184. Id.
185. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890) ("With man's
relations to his Maker and the obligations he may think they impose, and the
manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those
subjects, no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society,
designed to secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not
interfered with. However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions
regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation.").
186. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162-63.
187. See supra Part IV.A.
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how to square one line of religion cases that adopted a positive
posture toward religion, for instance, by recognizing the
significance of religion to Americans, with another line of cases
that guarded the state and its organs against the infusion of
religion, whether through establishmentarian features or religious
practices by public officials. The Court's view of religion and
religious institutions, as powerfully constructive forces in America,
is apparent in one noteworthy nineteenth century case that was
decided after the ratification of the Bill of Rights and after
disestablishment.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States is particularly
illustrative of the deferential posture the Court typically adopted
with respect to the role and function of religion in the American
polity. 18 8 Here, a church had contracted with an English
clergyman to lead its congregation as pastor. 8 9 The clergyman
was subsequently charged with violating federal employment laws
that prohibited an employer from contracting with foreign laborers
for employment in the United States. 190 On appeal, the Court
reversed the lower court's decision, relying largely upon principles
of statutory interpretation to read the federal law as applying only
to unskilled laborers and not to professionals, such as ministers or
pastors. 1 91
The Court permitted itself to ponder the larger question that lay
behind the frontage: What does religion mean in America? It
meant, according to the Court, that without religion America
would not be, well, America:
[N]o purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious
people. This is historically true. From the discovery of this
continent to the present hour, there is a single voice making
this affirmation.
t92
The Court proceeded to review the religious content of the
various charters authorizing the founding of the first American
colonies, as well as the religious roots of the Declaration of
Independence. The Court then paused to consider the constitutions
of the several states and noted that each made reference to religion
and religious obligations:
188. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
189. Id. at 458.
190. Id.
191. Id. at472.
192. Id. at 465.
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If we examine the constitutions of the various states, we
find them in a constant recognition of religious obligations.
Every constitution of every one of the 44 states contains
language, which either directly or by clear implication,
recognizes a profound reverence for religion, and an
assumption that its influence in all human affairs is
essential to the well-being of the community. 1
93
Far from recoiling from these obligations, wrote the Court,
citizens passionately invite and embrace these references to
religion and religious obligations.1 94 Quite simply, America is a
religious nation sustained by a religious people. Indeed, when one
turns to the formative documents from the American founding,
such as the Declaration of Independence or the U.S. Constitution
or state constitutions, the reader cannot help but perceive from
these texts a harmonious message trumpeting the nourishing
quality of religion to America:
There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a
universal language pervading them all, having one
meaning. They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious
nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of
private persons. They are organic utterances. They speak
the voice of the entire people.
5
Insisting that America is a religious nation that was founded
and is preserved by a religious people, the Court then returned to
the facts of the case-a church hiring an English pastor to come to
the United States-and took measured care to stress the
importance of religion to fortifying the metaphorical structure of
American civil society. 1
96
Next, the Court proposed a thought experiment in which a
congressional bill reached the floor of the Congress proposing to
prohibit any Roman Catholic church from hiring a Cardinal, any
Episcopal church a Canon, any Baptist church a Reverend, or any
Jewish synagogue a Rabbi.1 97 "[C]an it be believed," questioned
the Court in rhetorical fashion (framing the question such that the
answer of course is no) "that [such a bill] would have received a
minute of approving thought or a single vote?"'198  Never,
according to the Court, would such a bill have received serious
193. Id. at 468.
194. Id. at 468-69.
195. Id. at 470.
196. Id. at 470-71.
197. Id. at 471-72.
198. Id. at 472.
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thought because it aimed to do something "which the whole history
and life of the country affirm could not have been intentionally
legislated against."'199 Thus, as the Court made plain, religion
occupied then, as now, a privileged place in the hearts of both the
makers and interpreters of the law, and held an acknowledged
status of ascendancy that was shared by no other institution.
Yet the Court also recognized the danger of blending religion
with government. Despite accepting that Americans were a deeply
religious people, the Court was reluctant to give free rein to
religion. Perhaps nowhere was this reticence more apparent than
in one of the first charitable bequest cases to reach the Supreme
Court docket.20  In Vidal v. Girard's Executors,20 1 the Court
betrayed in plain view the unsettled tension that lay at the source of
the developing incoherence of establishment jurisprudence.
Consider first the facts of the case. Upon the death of Girard-a
Frenchman who had emigrated from his home to the United
States-his heirs and others challenged the validity of his last will
and testament.20 2 Among his several directives, Girard had set
aside part of his fortune to build and sustain a residential college in
the state of Pennsylvania in order to educate poor, white, orphaned
children between the ages of six and ten.20 3  In addition to
specifying such details as the location of the school, admission
requirements, and curriculum, Girard insisted against religion in
all its manifestations, forbidding the college from employing
anyone to discharge any station related to religion, prohibiting
instructors from teaching religious subjects, and even barring
missionaries and ministers from visiting the college.2 4 Girard's
stated objective in establishing these proscriptions was "that all the
instructors and teachers in the college shall take pains to instill into
the minds of the scholars the purest principles of morality." 20 5
Though his will had made no such express mention, Girard's
reasoning was surely inspired by the governing philosophy of his
native France, where secularism has long been a flagstaff.
20 6
199. Id.
200. The first charitable bequest case involving the subject of religion
appears to have been Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association v. Hart's
Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1 (1819). But neither principles of religious
freedom nor those of religious establishment informed the Court's resolution of
Hart's Executors. See id.
201. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
202. Id. at 186.
203. Id. at 184.
204. Id. at 197.
205. Id. at 200.
206. Id. at 127-28.
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Indeed, secularism is but one of the formative values pressed upon
the French citizenry toward the larger purpose of cultivating a
willing subordination of the self in favor of the superior whole, and
shedding all distinguishing ties or affiliations or involvements that
threaten nationhood, loyalty to the republic, and the integrity of the
bond marrying citizen to state.
20 7
Girard's requirement of a similar secularism as the foundation
of his college was condemned by the plaintiffs in Vidal as
derogatory and hostile to Christianity.2 0 8  The Court ultimately
rejected this challenge and authorized the construction of the
college according to Girard's specifications, concluding that
Girard's secular conditions precedent to the establishment of the
college were not in fact contrary to Pennsylvania's Constitution.2 9
Recognizing that the "country [is] composed of such a variety of
religious sects," 210 the Court observed of the Pennsylvania Bill of
Rights211 that "language more comprehensive for the complete
protection of every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be
used; and it must have been intended to extend equally to all sects,
whether they believed in Christianity or not, and whether they
were Jews or infidels."2t 2 This case was a victory for those who
understood religious freedom as including both freedom of religion
(the right to practice and observe any religion) and freedom from
religion (the right not to practice and observe any religion at all).
The Court's result in Girard's Executors is not as noteworthy
as its animated reasoning. It is clear that the Court was compelled
to reach this result in order to comport with the command of
207. This French theory of secularism is called laicitg. It is a difficult term
to define but it is central to the French philosophy of the secular state. See T.
Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and LalcitM: A Comparison of the United
States and France, 2004 BYU L. REv. 419, 420-21, 428-30 (2004). See also
Rik Torfs, Church and State in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands:
Unexpected Similarities and Hidden Differences, 1996 BYU L. REv. 945, 950-
55 (1996) (discussing theory of laicit6); Jessica Fourneret, Note, France:
Banning Legal Pluralism by Passing a Law, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 233, 235-37 (2006) (tracing history of laiciti).
208. Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 197.
209. Id. at 200-01.
210. Id. at 198.
211. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 3 ("That all men have a natural and
indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences; that no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent;
that no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the
rights of conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law, to any
religious establishments or modes of worship.").
212. Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 198.
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religious freedom under the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights.2 3 What
is less clear, however, is why the Court effectively undermined the
force of its result by construing Girard's will as permitting
individual instructors to share with pupils their own religious
opinions in the context of instilling into their minds "the purest
principles of morality."
214
Nowhere, the Court observed, does Girard's will "say that
Christianity shall not be taught in the college. But only that no
ecclesiastic of any sect shall hold or exercise any station or duty in
the college. ' 2 15 Pursuing its exercise in revisionist textualism, the
Court zeroed in on Girard's requirement "that all the instructors
and teachers in the college shall take pains to instill into the minds
of the scholars the purest principles of morality," 21 6 only to ask
rhetorically "where can the purest principles of morality be learned
so clearly or so perfectly as from the New Testament?"
217
According to the Court, the only point that could be reliably
discerned from the will was that "he desired to exclude sectarians
and sectarianism from the college, leaving the instructors and
officers free to teach the purest morality, the love of truth, sobriety,
and industry, by all appropriate means; and of course, including the
best, the surest, and the most impressive." 218 This latter reference
was to the Bible. This case ended the Court's excruciating effort
to reconcile Girard's unambiguous prohibition from his college of
all things and persons religious in nature with the Court's own
reverence for religion and its appreciation of the focal function of
religion in American life.
Vidal transparently demonstrates the Court's early reluctance
to negotiate its obeisance to two masters: constitutional law and
religion. Both federal and state constitutions at the time had
prohibited established religion and promised religious freedom.
However, applying these two principles of constitutional law with
vigor required the Court to close its eyes to the reality that America
was a religious nation, specifically, a Christian nation. It was thus
unthinkable for the Court to give breadth to the guarantee of
religious freedom in such a way as to displace the primacy of
213. As of the date of decision in Vidal, the several states were not yet
subject to the U.S. Bill of Rights. Indeed, it was not until 1940 that the federal
analogue to the Pennsylvanian religious freedom clause was applied to constrain
the actions of the several states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause).
214. Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 200.
215. Id. at 199.





Christianity, just as it was equally implausible that the Court would
render a decision that undermined in any substantive fashion the
role of religion in America.
Other Supreme Court cases during the first American century
reveal a now familiar effort both to defend the people from the
perceived dangers of religion and to leave room for them to
recognize the good that can come only from religion. For instance,
only a few years after the last of the American states officially
disestablished, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights was
not effective as against an action by a state to impair religious
liberty: "The Constitution [of the United States] makes no
provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws:
nor is there any inhibition imposed by the Constitution of the
United States in this respect on the states., 219 The effect of this
decision was, therefore, to re-establish official religion in the
disestablished states. Consider that if a state purports to
disestablish its church, yet is subject to no sanction for violating
the religious freedom safeguards in the Bill of Rights, that state
may actually, though not officially, stealthily reinstate its
preferences for the formerly established church.
This very issue came before the Supreme Court in the form of a
dispute over liability for cargo that had been lost because it had
been left unattended during an official dazy of fasting and prayer
proclaimed by the Governor of a state. The Court imposed
liability not on the carrier who had delivered the goods, but rather
on the offloaders who should have discharged the goods from the
vessel and not shirked their job duties in order to observe a
voluntary holiday: "The proclamation of the Governor is but a
recommendation. It has not the force of law, nor was it so
intended. The duties of fasting and prayer are voluntary, and not
of compulsion, and holiday is a privilege, not a duty.' ' 221 The
Court also added that the proclamation was not intended to weigh
heavily on "man's conscience to abstain from his worldly
occupations on [that] day., 222 The Court, likewise, made certain to
recognize the broad significance of this day of prayer to the lives
of those who observe it, highlighting that the day was "an excellent
custom" 223 that had been "piously named., 224 This was one of twocases decided by the Court on the subject that year.225
219. Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845).
220. Richardson v. Goddard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28 (1859).
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A few years later, the Court again addressed the issue of the
day of rest. This time, the Court upheld a prohibition against labor
226on Sunday. Concluding that the Sunday law was intended to
"protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which
comes from uninterrupted labor,"227 the Court cast aside the claim
that the Sunday law was an effort "to legislate for the promotion of
religious observances., 228 Those laws "have always been deemed
beneficient and merciful laws, especially to the poor and
dependent, to the laborers in our factories and workshops and in
the heated rooms of our cities; and their validity has been sustained
by the highest courts of the States., 229 Therefore, the justification
for Sunday laws was framed in terms of state police powers. This
approach, however, was perhaps part of a larger effort-as
replicated in some states23-to fashion a secular justification for a
religious practice.23'
Another area of early religion jurisprudence demonstrates a
similar reluctance of the judiciary to undermine the sanctity and
sovereign independence of religious institutions. For instance,
courts typically steer clear of intrachurch disputes, preferring
224. Id.
225. In the other case, the Supreme Court held that a steamboat company-
despite sailing on a Sunday in violation of a state law-was entitled to damages
against a railroad company that had left debris in the river. Philadelphia,
Wilmington & Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Philadelphia & Havre de Grace Steam
Towboat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209 (1859).
226. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
227. Id. at 710.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Ex parte Andrews, 18 Cal. 678, 684 (1861) ("At least, the
mere fact, as we have intimated, that the closing of shops on that day might be
more convenient to Christians, or might advance their religious aims or views, is
no reason for holding the law unconstitutional."); State v. Petit, 77 N.W. 225,
226 (Minn. 1898) ("In some states it has been held that Christianity is part of the
common law of this country, and Sunday legislation is upheld, in whole or in
part, upon that ground. Even if permissible, it is not necessary to resort to any
such reason to sustain such legislation. The ground upon which such legislation
is generally upheld is that it is a sanitary measure, and as such a legitimate
exercise of the police power."); Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, 323 (1848)
("Though it may have been a motive with the law-makers to prohibit the
profanation of a day regarded by them as sacred-and certainly there are
expressions used in the statute that justify this conclusion-it is not perceived
how this fact can vitally affect the question at issue. All agree that to the well-
being of society, periods of rest are absolutely necessary.").
231. See Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L.
REV. 675, 685-88 (2000).
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instead to let religious institutions govern themselves.232 In one of
the leading intrachurch dispute cases, the Supreme Court cautioned
judges not to "impermissibly substitute[] [their] own inquiry into
church polity and resolutions" for those of the ecclesiastical
tribunals of a church. 233 The petitioners sought-and eamed-a
reversal of the Illinois Supreme Court's invalidation on grounds of
arbitrariness of the decision of church authorities to remove and
defrock a bishop. The Court held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the
decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical policy, but must accept such decisions as binding on
them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or
policy before them. 234
The Court ruled that assessing the petitioner's claim-that an
employment decision by the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese
was arbitrary-would necessarily entail an impermissible inquiry
"into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly
requires the church judicatory to follow, or else into the
substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the
ecclesiastical question.q235  Were the Court to engage in this
judicial analysis, it would be "exactly the inquiry that the First
Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the
proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must
accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds
them." 23
6
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the rule in
Watson v. Jones,237 a nineteenth century case holding that
"whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these
232. See, e.g., Dobrota v. Free Serbian Orthodox Church "St. Nicholas," 952
P.2d 1190 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the court may not decide dispute
between church and priest concerning termination of employment); Parish of the
Advent v. Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 688 N.E.2d 923 (Mass. 1997)
(holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to resolve dispute on the
validity of an election of a new vestry and on the disqualification of certain
individuals from serving as members of the parish corporation); Sacrificial
Missionary Baptist Church v. Parks, No. 71608, 1997 WL 812168 (Ohio App.
8th Dec. 30, 1997) (holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to intervene
in dispute concerning termination of pastor).
233. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708
(1976).
234. Id. at 709.
235. Id. at 713.
236. Id.
237. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them., 238 The dispute
involved a disagreement over church property between two groups
of disagreeing church trustees, one of which ultimately defected. 39
The defecting trustees later denied the action and authority of the
church whose property they were then. claiming.240  The Court
refused to intervene in the intrachurch dispute, opting instead to
abide by the judgment of the church.24'
The reasoning in Watson was underpinned by the rule of
sovereign independence of religious institutions, which regards a
church as a self-governing community in which those who join the
group do so with an implied consent to bind themselves to its
practices and conventions. The corollary of this proposition is that
if a group member is aggrieved by a decision of the church, then
that member cannot appeal to a secular court to reverse the
determination of the sovereign church. According to this theory,
the mechanisms of the church and state are wholly separate,
autonomous, and-in their own respective spheres-authoritative
as to their membership rules.
The Court's respect for the inner workings of religious
institutions was also evident in another case decided in the same
year as Watson. But the Court's deference was tempered by the
interest of advancing the broader principle of majoritarian
democracy, which, in Bouldin v. Alexander, the Court determined
had to trump the competin interest of allowing a church
congregation to govern itself. 2 Here, the Court was called to
settle a dispute between two church factions, each believing
itself-and not the other-to constitute the same church
congregation. The minority faction held a meeting to oust trustees
and members of the majority faction from the congregation, to
which the removed members responded by filing suit to be restored
to their positions.
243
In announcing its decision-that the removal was null and
void-the Court took great care to stress that it has "no power to
238. Id. at 727.
239. Id. at 681.
240. Although the Court did not rely on it, Baker v. Nachtrieb, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 126 (1856), may have informed its judgment. In Baker, the Court ruled
that defecting members of a church could not repossess a corresponding share of
the church property. Id. at 130.
241. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
242. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40(1872).
243. Id. at 137.
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revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision
from membership." 244 The Court added that it:
[C]annot decide who ought to be members of the church,
nor whether the excommunicated have been regularly or
irregularly cut off .... But we may inquire whether the
resolution of expulsion was the act of the church, or of
persons who were not the church and who consequently
had no right to excommunicate others.
245
Since the minority faction had improperly sought to remove a
majority of the congregation, the Court invalidated the actions of
the minority. "In a congregational church, the majority, if they
adhere to the organization and to the doctrines, represent the
church " and "an expulsion of the majority by a minority is a void
act.,246
As demonstrated above, several states may have duly ratified a
constitutional provision disclaiming the union of religion and the
public sphere. Nonetheless, alongside these constitutional
protections against establishment, some states preserved a special
status for religious institutions. This effort to make a special place
for religion in America reflected the uneasy debate among
Americans about how to mediate the tension between ensuring
religious freedom for religious minorities and adhering to one's
own majority religious faith. Instead of being settled when it
reached the Supreme Court, this debate continued. As it decided
religious disputes on its docket, the Court sought at once to protect
public offices and institutions from the divisive forces of steadfast
religious conviction and to ensure the American people that they
could freely practice their respective religions without shedding or
suppressing their religious beliefs as they entered public life.
Thus, the Court was thrust into the role of conciliator between
those who would remove religion from the public square and those
who could not conceive of the United States without religion,
which, to them, was the cornerstone around which the nation was
founded and its civil and political structures erected.
V. CONCLUSION
Principled nuance is a virtue when there are elemental
questions of democratic theory standing in the balance that will
align the nation on its constitutional trajectory. This is precisely
244. Id. at 139.
245. Id. at 139-40.
246. Id. at 140.
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what characterized the work of the Supreme Court in the early
elaboration of American religion jurisprudence. Though modem
establishment doctrine may be incoherent in some consequential
ways, it is inaccurate to trace the origins of this incoherence to the
Supreme Court. Granted, the Court vacillated during the first
American century between which of two dueling models-
protective or aspirational-should govern the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause. But the Court did so only because such was
the state of public feeling and discourse at the time in the
American union. Early establishment doctrine reflected the
changing contours of the public debate about the proper role of
religion in the public square and the relationship between religious
and civil institutions. Both of these institutions discharged a
critical function in the creation of the American republic.
Going forward, the Supreme Court will continue to struggle
with how best to umpire the debate between those who fear
religious division in multicultural America and those who believe
abidingly that religious virtue must illuminate the machinery of
government and pilot its human operators. The Court should
welcome this debate. It will be a teaching moment for the
American people about themselves and the path they wish to chart
together in the coming years. The Court should not impose its
preferred conception of the balance between religion and
government, neither preempting nor short-circuiting the continuing
constitutional conversation among Americans on this fateful issue
of nationhood. The founding promise of participatory democracy
is furthered, and indeed very well served, when citizens engage
each other on the shape and content of their public institutions.
As a matter of normative theory, the conventional wisdom may
perhaps demand that the United States adopt one of the two
competing views on the role of religion in a liberal democracy.
But, as a matter of practice, disconnected theory must not be
permitted to trump the freely expressed convictions of Americans
about how they wish to govern themselves. This is a pillar of self-
determination and popular sovereignty. The Court-which draws
its legitimacy from the people themselves-must not merely
tolerate these public discussions. The Court must do more. It must
create constitutionally protected space for citizens to deliberate
both privately and publicly-and to subsequently express
themselves in the public square-about issues of faith and belief.
These fundamental matters of statecraft may be resolved only
when public institutions reflect the will of the people.
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